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Two Models of Legal Principles 
StepheT! R. Peny'�< 
Do legal principles exist, and, if so, what theoretical account can we 
give of them? In order w answer these questions, it will be helpful 10 say 
something first about the naturt: of principles generally. Principles arc one 
of several types of normative standard that figure in practical reasoning , 
that is, reasoning about what ought to be done. Their characte r is probably 
most readily grasped by comparison to another type of normative standard, 
namely, rules. 1 therefore begin with a discussion of the general 
relationship between rules and principles. Moving on to the specific case of 
law, I sketch two models of leg;ll rules, and then show that associat�.:cl with 
each is a corresponding model of legal pri nc iple s. The first of these, which 
I call the rationalir,atiOil model, charact.erizes legal principles in te rms or 
the bestjust.ification that can be given for existing settled law. The second , 
which l call the primacy model, takes legal principles to be the upsltol of a 
process chat I label "episternic entrenchmcnL.'' Thi� means that the 
reasoning in previous cases is to be treated by sub ·cquerH courts a· 
presumptively correct, but the presumption can be rebutted if a later court 
is confident to a sufficien t degree-that i'i, CC'lnfidcnt beyond an 
appropriate cpistemic threshold-that the earlier court made a rnistakc. 
With the distinction between the rationalizalion and the primacy models in 
hand, I next present an intcprctive overview of Ronald Dworkin's various 
remarks about legal principles. Final ly, I disc uss a recem c1 itique of legal 
principles that has been advanced by Larry Alexander and Ken Kress. 
I. RULES :\1\'L) PRTNClPU;:S; GENERAL 
For presen t purposes, three rcl<lted points of difference be tween rules 
and principles sho\tld \)f' noted. Because the statu· of principles is a les 
controversial maucr in morality than in law, I shall assume for the time 
being that we are talking about moral niles and principles. 
The lirst difference con('C'rns the logical charar.lr:r of each of tbe two 
types of standf1.rd, by which I mean the formal role each plays in the 
str uc ture of pract ic:ll reasoning. As Dwor kin poinlcd out in a famous C'arly 
article , 1 rules opera te in an all-or-nod1ing fashion. If the facts of a given 
� John J. O'Hlicn P1c>ft·s�'>1 n f !..1w :md Professor of Plii l o s u p h y , Uni\'(;1.,11)' of 
Pennsylvania. l wolllcl ltk�· 10 11ia11k 1)1)' cnlk:�gues M::nthcw Aclkr. Lc·c> Ka11., and F.c ic Posn<.:l 
for their cncnmctll.S 011 �111 t·.1rtkr 1lin!t. A l't.• sion uf this c.��iiY was prc.:sc.:nt<.:d :tt the: 
J1111Spn1d('nce Secti011 of' tht' Amtric:\n ,·\!i�ociaiiOil of L:.w Srhools Annual 1\lr;t:ling in 
j:111ll:1r:·. 1996. 
I. Srr Ronald Dworkin.{; Lmc• ,, ·\r.\tnr• oj Uu/, .. ,?. 33 . C:l1i L. Rc:1'. 14. 22-29 (l!lG7). 
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case are such that the conditions of application of a valid rule have been 
met, then the rule mu ·t be applicct; the rule is, in tho ·c circumstances, 
"conclusive.''� If, however, the rule ' s conditions of application have not 
been met, then the rule can contribute nothing to the resolution of the 
case. Principles, by contra 1, possess what Dworkiu called a dimension of 
weighl or importance; a given principle inclines toward but doc not 
demand a particular result, since it can be outwt:ighecl by principle that 
point in the opposi te clireCLion. Principles are, logically speaking. a species 
of what Joseph Raz calls first-order reasons for action. , They bear directly, 
albeit usually inconclusively, on the question of whal ought to be clone. 
Further, the principles that are relevant to a particular situation arc 
assumed to be commensurable and capable of being aggregated, along 
their dimension of weight, so as to produce an overall balance of 
principles. The balance or principles, which is a special case of what Ra1. 
calls the balance of fir t-order reasons, >�cld an overall conclusion about 
what ought to be done. 
The second difference be tween rules and principles concerns their 
cvnlent. Plinciplcs refer more or less directly to-indeed, they are oCten 
indistinguishable from-various values, imerests, lighL'\, policies and goals 
that arc, given our assumption that we arc dealing with moral prindples, 
themselves moral in natun.:.1 In Raz's terminology, prin ciples arc general 
Jirst-order reasom that have been drawn from morality (as oppo ·cd to 
those that arc based on, say, self-interest). Rules. by contr:lst, usually just 
specify a course of action to be followed in a particular type of 
circumstance. In other words, the explicit coment of principles i-; value­
oriented, whereas that of rules is action�oricntcd. 
The third, related, diiTerencc concerns the justyicnl01) ''tdationship 
between rules and principh: . Principles can ju!->Lify rules, but not vice 
versa."' A (moral) rule is based on an ail-in, conclusive judgment about 
rrJn1nt,•tl m Ronald Dworkin, Till' MotM ofl<t�/,.� I. 111 T;lldng Rights Sn iously H, :!2-28 (IC\'. ed. 
1!177) [her<'inaftc• Dworkin, T.1ki11g Rights Scrioush·j. 
2. I borww this 1crm fron1 li.L·\. llart, The Conn·pt ofL11w 261 (:?d nl. l�Hll). 
3. St•rJoscph R.n, P•:�rli,.t�l Rca�on allcl No11n�J6-:n (2cl �·cl. l0VO). 
·l. In addilion lO the Jtde/principlc cli51inctiun. Dwv1ki11 also cl1cw a distinninn in l11s 
r:arly work bctwccn p1111cipks and policies. The lattcJ dhtinction ruiS across 1hc fonntT, �inn· 
it is concerned with diffcn.:n1 kmd.1 of content that principles, lllldt:J.�toocl in tht· st•nst· of rhc· 
rule, J.ll inciplc distinction, mi�h1 haw: p1inciplcs w<:n: said h)• Dworkin 10 be cunccrnt:d with 
imlividu:-�1 nghts, "111·1�'::ts pulicics were conccrnnl With �oriid gn.\1�. S,•;• Dworkin. Tal-.ing 
Right'; Scriou�ly, Itt/"" note I. at 22. 32-8·1. Iu tim css;:�r I �lull ht· discu.��ing unl) the 
Jlilc/principle distinction. 
::>. Principh:· <He, ns J\IJtl'<l. lir�t-ordc• rt:ason� th<ll .1re mor.d in charattct; .1s �w.h, tilt:}' 
,,•ill necessarily possess �Ollie IIJIIIinnlln dcg1r:c of gencrnlny. l\ot .111 first-on.ler n·a�orh nec:d 
hr gcner;J): a 1 c:1son of cll-lnlnt:sr mi ght be: relevant o11h to .1 �pcl"iflc pcr�o11 o11 .1 n� nlir 
orr:t�ion. for �x.1111pk. Tlu: gcunalit)' ot pnnciples JIICO\J\S that, given tlwu v.iluc-ullt'Jllcd 
CCJI1tcnl. thq will o•clina11l) he: 1c:lt>\LIIll 10 tnu•e th.111 ,, 'ingl<; l)lJl" of tJCtit•n: thu� ,1 'inglc: 
principle could fi�11n· in the jmtitiL.aio11 of 111u1t: 111�111 c,nt· '''or:-�1 n1k. On t111: •IIIWI k111d ·' 
mn, al r11k ro11ld, "i\'<·n irs ::tnio11 IJI ic11tcd c.:ontt:JII, runn·iv.,hly lw ju�tili•·d by lllf)ll' th;m Wit' 
•ct '•f pt i11nplt:�. 
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what ought to be done in a certain situation (mor� accurately, in a certain 
t.ype of situation). One way that such a judgment can be justi fied i by 
reference to the bala nce of re levant first-order moral reasons, i.e., by 
reference to the balance of principles : the weight of the principles that 
argue for a given course of action is aggregated and weighed again� t those 
that call for the opposite cou rse of action. This is not necessarily the only  
way that rules can be justified-the Kantian categorical imperative prcsent.s 
a poss ible alternative, for example-but it is an imponam one. IL is the 
only route to the justification of a rule that we will need to consider here. 
It will be helpful to Lhc discussion of legal principles helow if we 
explore the theoretical nature of rule s in sornewhat greater detail. Bearing 
in mind that we are still concerned with the moral case only and not with 
law, what more can be said about the rules that are supposed to be 
justified by selS or pri nciples? One an wer to this question is offered by 
Raz, who claims that rul es are instances of what he calls ccond-order 
reasons for action." The mo t important cat(:gory of second-order reasons 
is that of exclusionary (or peremptory) reasons, which arc reasons not to 
act  on one or more first-order reasons. On Raz's view a ru le is justified by 
relevam flrst-order reasons, but it subsequently excludes, or preempts, 
those reasons' direct application to the type of situation Lhe rule covers. 
This is the source of the rule's second-order, exclusionary aspect. At the 
same time, according to Rat., the rule rep laces the first-order reasons that 
justify it and itself takes on the status of a fir t·ordcr reason; thus the rule 
dues not just exc l ude other rea ·ons but functions in its own right as a 
reason for a particular co urse of action. It is Raz ' s claim that rule have a 
second-order, exclusionary dimension that will be of most conccm to us 
here, however, since that is how Raz accounlS for the defining logical 
characleristic t)f rules, namely , their conclusiveness. 
Raz's account of rules i a particularly clear and prcci e version of a 
more general view which regards rules as operati ng at a cenain norma tive 
distance from the princi ples that ultimately justify them. The claim i ·, i n  
effen, that the.: rule is r1.dopted by some person or group. although in the 
case of morality this process would pre um:�.bly be a fairly in fonnal one. 
After adoption the mlc> takes on <t certain normative life of its own; in a 
l arge range of cases it can be followed or applied without reference back 
to the.; princip les that ,.,ere original!}' thoug ht to justify it. Le t mt� caLl this 
the auto11omous conception of rules, the best-known cxemplificacion of 
which is the type of rule associated with rule-utilitarianism. There arc well­
known reasous as to why one might wam in this war to put a ccnain 
normative distanct..: between rult:s :1ncl the p rinciples that ullimarcly justify 
them. Because the. c reason' are given ckar and general expression in 
Raz's theory of practical reasoning. I shall take the. uto nornous co nception 
6 . .  \,, Ri17., lii/J"' rrcJre :;, .11 J�). 58-S�. 73: 111! ol,w.Jn��·ph R.tl, Tlw :\llthr)llt) of L:lw JG I�J 
11979) [hcrl'in:,ftn R;1L, .\nthorit\]: j<'lseph Rvl, Tin· ,\Jnr.liit of Fr<•,·clonl 11�1�. 5i·j'J (l!M6) 
[her t•tnaflt'l Raz, F1 ccdornl, 
790 S2 IOWA LAW REV!F.\V [ L 997] 
of rules to be exemplili cd by Raz's parr icul ar version of that approach. Raz 
argues for the uomwl jllslificatioll thesis, which fonus part of a persuasive 
general theory of legitimate pol it i cal authority. The basic idea is that it is 
both rational and morally appropriate to treat a rule as an independent 
reason if by so doing you <1Te likely better to comply with the principles (or 
other reasons) that apply to you than if you tried to act on your own 
judgment of what the halancc of princjple (or balance of general reasons) 
requires.7 Under certain circum tancc�s. it is not only morally appropriate 
to treat a rule as an independent reason, but morally required:� Graming 
that it can at least sometimes be appropri�lte to rely on the autonomous 
conceptjon of rules, the question l would like to consider next is this: is 
there a defensible conception of rules that docs not assume that rule· are 
normatively distanced from their justif'yjng principles? 
I magine for a moment that morality was epistemically transparent, by 
which 1 mean that there existed ·ome simple and almost-impossible-to· 
misapply decision-procedure for deterntining the answe rs to moral 
q uestions . There would be straightforward methods for determining the 
relevance of principles, summing their weights , and ascertaining what 
action was demanded by Lhe resulting- balance or principles. Let us assume 
further that all ernpirical matters that might affect the outcome of a moral 
question would also be capable or easy dctc:nnination. Now there would 
undoubtedly still be a place for moral rules in ·uch a world, if only 
because rules save time and effot t; it is, among other things, convenient to 
have a set of guides to conduct that allows us to avoid repeating the same 
process of moral reasoning, howt:ver simple, on every relevant occasion. 
But these guides to conduct would not have to be rule in the autonomous 
sense, or at least not all of them would have to be.u In our own world, 
where morality is not cpistemically tr:llt�parcnt, there are presumably ca cs 
where the normal justification the is applies simply because the rule-maker 
has greater moral knowledge, or at least greater .knowledge about the 
empirical conditions under which moral principl es are to he applied, than 
do the rule followers . In rhe cpistemically transparent world this gap in 
knowledge could not arise, but even o it would still be useful to have rules 
Lo cover such situations. These rules would not, however, be independent 
reasons of the kind posited by the autonomous conception. They would 
7. SPrJoseph Raz. Ethics tn th<' Pnblic Donmin lfH-:;W•! (199tJ); Ra1, Frerdonl. .Htfnn not<' 
6. at 3!3-69. 
8. SPt• lbz, Fr ecdorn, IU/IIfl note G. at 60. 
9. Thc-1<• ,If<.: rcna111 C:IS<.:S where snnH:tlti11g lih· an ,lLtWnullHJtl.<. r 11k wuulrl h�: rtccc:�s:1ry 
even ill :1 1\'cJIIcl in 1\'lticlt ntot .. tli t y w�s r·pi�tc·ndrally trn"'P�ll'tllL Tlt<: . .,c involvr· siruations 
\\'h<.:rc tit<! 110 dilfc·t'f!nn· them, 1 r• . . the tht:�is th::11 an t::<errist· 11f illllh�Hity sho111d rn .. tkc 110 
lhffcrenn: to wh;,r it,o; suhtc•r-t.s 011ght lt• do), doe� n01 h11ld. R:11. giw� thrt·c cx:unptc� of such 
�illnllions: fir.st. \,·ltcre tllf· ptt·ns�· ;tc·ril>n dt:lll<111decl hv ntomlil)" rs undndctc:rlllirwd: �eronrl. 
wl tt·t c: :1 torln'mion is l<'ttllitt·cl tn soht· ;\ LuOtdin.cllcJll prc.•blt·m; rtncl third. when· ;en 
atllhoril:tlil•c· dict:oivc: i� rc:qlllil'd ' "  illll'<" a iJlisotrcr�' dtlc•flrlll:l. St'l' R.rz, Frl'('ciorn, wfn/1 note: 
li, .\t ·I�·S l; Iff n/.111 Andr l'f 1\l;u rll•>r, I 11 t�r fH <'l.llie>fl .111d J..q�:•l Tht'ol) I I(). I i, 176·B I ( ( !)92). 
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simply be statementS of ail-in judgments concerning what ought to be 
clone , a determined by the relev,mt balance of principles; they would, as it 
were. summarize the aggregate upshot of those princ iples. Le;:t me 
therefore refer to this alternative conception of rules a the !ltl'l1mi.Ot)' 
conception. 
Of course morality is nol, for us, epistemically transparent, but that 
docs not mean that we have no use for the summary conception of rul..: ·. 
This point will be illustrated b)' the discussion of law in the following 
section. 
11. Ruu.:s AND PRINCIPLE : TilE CASE OF LAW 
We turn next to legal, a opposed to purely moral, rules and 
principles. Notice, to begin, that t.he amonornous conception of rules, 
when translated into the legal sphere , gives us an �.:sscn t ially positivist 
conception of law. The idea of adoption becomes. in this context, Lhe 
notion of enactment. some appropriate person or bod)' brings �l new legal 
rule into being b)' invoking a more or less formal en�ctmem procedure; 
the rule can subsequently be changed or abandoned, but to do so requires 
similar procedures of auuwrlmml and rejJeol. This model of legal rules fits 
certain lypes of laws better than othcr·s. In p<1l'lictrlar, it seems to provide a 
fairly arcurate acc<;Junt of leg(\! rules that ;"tre created by legis latures. For 
present purposes , however, I wis h to !'ocu on the lavv-rnaking activities of 
court::;, ming Anglo-American common-law ystcms as my primary example. 
It is clear enough that common-law court...'i create la\v, in a fonn that seems 
properly descr ibed as consisting of rules . It is, however, kss clear that these 
rules arc be t understood in accordance with the ntttonumous conception. 
It all depends on what point or purpo<;c we think the <.:!>mrnon law 
I( I serves. 
According lo legal po ilivi rn, the most fundamental point or purpose 
of law is to provide publicly ascer tainabk guides to conduct for th<.: 
population ;;u largc.11 On Raz's view, the law claims for itsdf the exrltlsivc 
authority to promulgate uch hi"Ltidcs because it irnplititly regards it elf a· 
morally legitimated by the normal jusrifictttion thesi.; il claims, iu effect, 
that citizens arc more likely to comply \vith Lhe reasons for action that 
apply to rbem if they obey the law than if they rry tn act on their own 
judgmtl lt. or course this claim might be mistaken, but it is rhc: fact that it 
is made at all th<H requires us, on a Razian vitw of the matter, to 
COIICcptualize all legal rules, indudin� comtno11-law rules, in Lcrms of tht" 
autonomous conception.1� For Raz, the aut<JJ1f)l11)' or legal rules means 
that they must be sollrce-bfl ed, that is, the)' must o(' iderlti1i::thle as lega l 
10. Fot .1 di�r11�sio11 of the llit:llwrlologir:�l coi\C'l'IIIS in lq,:.d th<:OI)' th;�t mal...c a 
diSCIIS�Ion of j}tJilll ro1 puqJCJSC n:k\lant, �<>c Stl·plu:n R. !'err:. lllll·t/ll•'''llil'lt a111i Mrthmlulagy 111 
'·"!;'II '/'h,·or,·, in Ltl\' and lnterprelation ' 17 (:\tnlrei �l.lllil(ll .:d .. 1005). 
ll. Srr Ra1, r\ull101 it). wfnn lh.llt: ti, ,1[ 50·51. 
1'2. s,., R�''· ,,/lift !Hil'' 7 . .tl 19�-20·1. 
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nlles solely hy reference to social facts. such as the activities uf legislatures 
and courts, without recourse to mural co nsidcrations.1:1 The picwre of t.hc 
common law in particular that emerges is one in which judge-made law is 
theoretically similar w that c reated by legislatures: courts i n  effect formally 
enact rules, and if thev later change their minds they amend or repeal 
them (say by distinguishing a precedent, or by overruling it). Common law 
legal rules are identifiable solely by reference to the law-making activities of 
the courts. 
Suppose, however, that we think the point or purpose of the common 
law i not to provide guides to conduct as such, but rather to settle 
disputes in ac cordance \Vith applicable princ iple· of justice and other 
relevant a ·pects of morality.H Then we might think that judges should 
decide a torts case, say, or a restitution problem, on the basis of their best 
moral judgment at the time the decision has to bt: made: they should 
formulate the h<dancc of mom/ principles as i t  then appears to them and 
decide the case accordingly. Because moral principles arc genera], the 
courts would almost inevitably express their conclusions in tern1s of general 
propositions that apply to a type of situation, and not just to the particular 
ca:;e. (The relevant "type'' would he determined by what facts were and 
were not u·eated by the general proposition itself as relevant Lo the 
resolution of the case.) Such general normative propositions would he, in 
effect, rules in the sense of the summary conception. Because there is no 
assumption that these rules arc posited or enaclccl in anything like the 
usual positivist en e, the resulting model of the common law is a 
nonpositivist one. 
The main logical cbaractcrislic of rules is, as we sow earlier, that they 
are conclusive; if a particular fact siwation falls within the rule's conditions 
of applicability, the rulE· must be followed. The sumu1ary rules described in 
the preceding paragraph would be conclusive in this sense so long as the 
cotut did 110l change ils mi11d about the unrledying balance of moral p·rinriple!. . . 
This is because such rule represent all-in judgments about the propcr 
moral disposition of a given type of case. Ilowever, in our nonepistemically 
transparent world, judge often do come to see the material issues in a 
different light; they regularly c. hange their views about what the relcvam 
balance of principles requires.b Sumrnary rules would thu. be continously 
moctified as the courts' perception of the underlying balance of principles 
c hanged. Autonomous rules, on the other hand, would be retained even if 
the courts c<tmc to rethink what the balance of principle demanded, or at 
least rhcy would be retained until Sttch time as the courts were willing and 
i n  a position to invoke the procedures of ame!lclmc nt or repeal. (For 
example, only the higher courts might have this power.) There is thus an 
1:�. Sn ill; 1fr nl111 R.az. :\\athortty, wt•m note: ti, fit •I.J-52. 
1·1. (.[ D110rkin. T<.�ka11g Right.'\ ��liuuslv, �ti/JIIl nolt: I, at 3:18, �4()..48. 
15. Till� ani�hl ilii'QI\'c:, :llllt,ng utht:l lhings. <1 ch:1ng(' in lil'll' ::�bout what th•· "type'' of 
the: cr1w •�; M)lltttil l lt'� tilt� is who�l i� .11 issue 1d1t:n a prior ctsc is distin!;lli�h('d, I'IJr n:.n11pl<·. 
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obvious sense in which autonomous rules arc ''more conclusive" than 
summa t)' rules. Autonomous rules are not, by their very nature, as sensitive 
to changes in opinion about the underlying balance of principles: 
consequently, their applicab i l i ty does not depend on any continuing 
assessment of what that balance requires. 
ll is an interesting que tion,  and one by no means easy to answer, 
whether the best theoretical account of the common law depicts it in terms 
of autonomous rules, u m m a ry rules, or a com bination of the two. I have 
argued elsewhere for au account in which summary rules p rcdolllinatc, 
an d I shall not repeat that eli .  cussion here. "' There is, however, one 
aspect of the common Jaw about which I must say something before 
proceeding further, and that is its incorporation of a doctrine of 
prcccclem. It might seem at first glance that, bccau c commo n-law courts 
claim to fo llow prior similar ca ·es, the rules they formulate could not 
possibly be understood in accordance wi th the summary conception ;  the 
details or the doc trine of precedent m ust comprise, it might be thought, 
the common-law analogues of the legislat i\'e prot:cdures of enactrnent, 
amendment and repeal. 
This line of thought i · too simple, however, hecause the values 
unclerl)'ing a doctrine of fo llowing prcccclent,  such as consistency and 
predicta.bility, 1 7  arc themselTJes principles in the logical sen e dctincd 
earlier, and can-indeed, should-be taken into account by jt� dges in 
determining what action. in rhc fo rm of a judicial decision, the balance of 
moral principles rcq11ir'es. A sutnmat)' concept ion of the con11non law in 
essence equates the law with cunclusic ms abo u t  what ought to be done 
according to the cu rrent judicial percq>tion of the overall balance of 
principles. But  the bal ance or principles is not Limele s and una ffected by 
the cour e o f  actual events; in tiH· case of a social practice like law, it  can, 
in particular, be i n fluenced by prior iuslitutional histcJI)'. Principles whic h 
embody such values as prc:clil.:labilit}' and consistency-let me refer to these 
generally a" t he "nile-of-law \'alue�"-i11cl inc toward.'> taking the same 
action that the insli tution took in sim ilar circu mstances in the pasc; they 
are, in that ·cnsc, in herently cons ervative in n:n u rc .  One;• fo rm 1 kH a 
16. Sl'e Stephen R. Pen). frulirird Ot.ligr�lton, f'rrm/ml w11l 1/11' r:om111011 Lmct. 7 Oxford .J. 
Leg11l Swtl. 2 1 5, 2�H-55 t 1 9H7) [he r  cin.tftct Pen v, jtultt'ial ObltWtlin11l; Stephcn R. PerT)'. 
St!rmui·Orr/,•r Nm ... ortl', Ullrl'lltli!ll\' 11111/ l.rgal 7 lil'lli)'· 6� S. Cal . L. Rev. 9 1 :3, 9fi:qJ:j ( 1 9  9) 
[ her tinaftcr Pen), Srumr/.()rd�r /(nt lflll \]. 
1 7. There is ,m i n te tc·stin!{ dd1il!c ..1� to \\'ltt· th c · c  curts istc.>1 1q . \tndcrsrootl twr in loo�c 
pragm:l(ic lCI Itt3 lnrt r�!ltt•r a� r.t l l i ng fur l''(\t,dit)' ol treat lltl'IH <1111011� (lC'l ·nns. is in ran a 
val11c to '''lllch <.Ourts should gil'l' wcight. s,,., t'.!-f· • Ln c: .\l c:x;n1ckr & Ken Kress. il/{(liJc,ll l.rgnl 
l'ri11 1 tJIII'), 111 Law and I n i apret;ll ion, wjmt note 10. ill '279. �9+!'J5, 30::>, 11/ll lltl··rl uJ l:\� l01va L. 
Rev. 73Y. 75·1-55. 76[• ( l !N7). Ft;t r c.l.,un.; \dttrh l slt.,J I cliscu ·s in seer ion VI, J hc::lieve r l t<�l 
COII$i�•�·nc1 i' surlr n 1 a l u r· .  R11 1  even if ( ,IJn \\'1 1111� i 1 1  thi,, dtt' .\l'�lllll<"f\1  in th� lCXl l t:lf171 in� 
mtaffnwd. It  is  e11u u�ll fo1  pt csr· n t  pur po��·� r lt.11 t l t�·r·c· be 111111� set of r.'l)tr�er\'atil'c l':lluc� 
( l tiCttcd 10 l.llt't 1 1 1  tllr rcxr  :t'l t l t c  ruk ·vf.law l'al ueo ) ,  lll,tl  inc li 11e tcH\'iiJ cls doing wh;�r krs 
bt:cn dor1t· lcdt�tl'. Ti t •· mn�t imp\ul:tttl and lf':'l'l �..onrrt > \ t.:tsi,\1 suth 1,1lttc· ts the nn·d fot 
SOII1(' tk grc•t: <Jf p r.:cl i( ( .c l l l l i t�  u1 st.t!Jt l i r �  in ilr<' k·.�.tl dc'CJ.,I t • l l · 1 11 . ck ing proc cs�. 
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doctrine of preceden t m igh t therefore take is s imp ly lO inc l ude the nt le-of­
law values i n  the overa l l balance of principles: the coun decides wh� ther to 
depart from or modify a past decision by weighi ng these values against 
other relevant pri n c i p les that might call fo r change. 
Without auempting to ummarize th e entire case for the under tand­
iug of the common law just sketched, let me just observe that the very 
me taphor of ''giving we igh t " to pri or cases, wh ich is so often em ployed i n  
descriptions o f  t h e  doctrine o f  precedent, is more remin iscent of a n  
under tanding o f  precedem based on the sumrn a1)' conce pt ion of rules 
than it i of one based on the autonomou conception. Th is is because the 
surnmat)' conception docs no t take prior dec isions into account by 
supposing that they genef"'cttc all-or-nOLhing rules, as the autonomous 
concept.ion would have it,  bu1 rat her by balanci ng or weighing 1 he values 
of con sistency and certai nty again l principles represcn1 ing other relevant 
concerns. The ummary concep t ion of l egal rules i!S thu · quite compat i ble 
wi th a pract ice of fo llowing precedent, in rhe sense of gi\'i ng weigh t to 
what ju dges h ave done i n  the:.: past. In fac t ,  on a proper understanding of 
wha1 should be taken i nto account in the balance of rnoral pri nc ip les , i t  is 
reasonahlc to th i n k t h at the summary conception calls fo r such a practi ce. 
Much more nt!eds to be said, of course, about the precise form that such a 
cloctrinl' of prcccclclil conlcl be expected to take. Some of the issues that  
arise in t h is regard wi l l  be addressed i n  the following sec tions. 
III.  TWO MODEL OF LEC.-\L PRINCIPLES 
W<? :-tr� t tO\\' i t 1  ;1. po ·it ion,  finall}', to �ay son1ething fu rther about the 
n<�ll l t ;;  of legal principle!> Lhemsc l\'es. One possible understanding of lt.:gal 
principles that l "t i l l  note hut n ot disc uss i n  detail holds that they must be 
·..:omplctely ·mtn:<'-h<IS" I i n  Raz's ·ense. This means that their status as legal 
principles, their  cn:1t�nt.  and their weight mu t all he determinable by 
reference to :;ncial Cacl$ alone, and hence without resort to moral 
ar,g-ument. In tht C;t.Sl' r)f legal pr in c ip les t h e  most pl a11siblc t hesis  is t h at 
1 ne ,, levant sucial f.�<: ts involve either a rule of recog n i tion cmbodring 
.5rne r��1 criteria ·Jf v<d idity tb,lt :tpply w principles, or else direct j udiral 
rtc!:ept�ttrc nf in dh'iclu.tl pri nci plc:s on a case-by-c ase basis . Either way, we 
would be rkalin.g- wi t h  focms of .iudicial  c ustom. As Dworkin po i n ted o u t  
..:;1rly on, i t  i s  l if!ic 1 d t  w see h o w  custom cuLtlcl b e  sufficiently n u ance d as 
·o be ab!e to ass ign de termi nate weighL" to individual ptinciplcs.1� In a 
' f:IJ.ted vein he alsc' 3rg, wd, to my mi TJcl convi nci ngly, that lega l principle::; 
are i11 any �venl 1 1 0i treated by cnmnwn-law judges as rooted purely in ''' - I · 1 1  1 I . I . CWHUl11 .  l' or presc: n t purpos�·s w1 accept l:"lat cone \tSton as 1<1V tng 
!y�;il -.:':Mhli"hcd, and acc�m li ngly will  not Si'.)' an)'Lhing more ab out t he 
,;(lur:· · t:ns .. rl rnocld of lt��·�l princ iples . 
.. -· -- ---·--------·------------- -----
·�1.  · ,, . t:lw>tk in, T:1 1, 1 1lg Rishr.'l .,�- � � �m,Jv . .  l ujJin Hnt(' 1 .  :n -1:�-.J l .  6 1-63. 
I �I. ,',,·� t.f. 
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In the preceding section I distinguished two different models of 
common law legal ntlcs. one based on the autonomous conception of rul es 
and one based on the sum mary conception. Corre paneling tO those two 
models of legal rules are two models of legal principles. To see thi · ,  
su ppose first that the common law consi t.s of autonomous legal rules 
which judges must , at least in certain contextS, treat as binding. (For 
present purposes \Ve may ignore those comexts where judges have the 
power to amend or repeal the rules.) Imagine that a case not directly 
covered by any existing legal rule has come before Judge Julia. If we 
assume that consistency and equal treatment are legal vinues.�0 the n one 
plausible approach Julia could take would be to decide the case in 
accordance with the set of prin cip les that best justify the total set of 
relevant and binding autonomous legal rult.:s.2 1 If all those mles appeared 
to Julia to be morally correct, then the justifyi ng princi ples would 
presumably also appear to her to be morally correct. It is likely, however, 
that she will be of the view that at least some of the autonomous ru les 
binding upon her arc, to !-iome degree: or in some way, morally l l l is takcn.  
I n  lhat case she might think i t  appropriate to rel y on wha t could be ca lled 
second-best plinciple , hy wh ich I mean princ iples that would morally 
jnsLify the stand i n g  autonomous rules if the latter were, con trary ro what 
julia and other judges wi ll inevitably come to think, themselves all moral lr 
valid. Seco nd-best p ri nc ip les provide the best available j\lstilicaLion for t h L· 
rules that the system insists . ful ia acce pt. As suc h, they would permit her to 
decide new cases, if not correctly (accord ing to her cu rrent moral views) , 
then a t  least consistently with the rules al t·eady in p lace . Let lll C cal l  this 
the wtionaliwlio>l model of legal principles. 
A.ssumc next th<H the common law consists of su mrmu-y mles. I u  that 
case i t  is principles rather than rule::; that arc, norntalively speaking , in the 
driver's seat. Rules arc simply . t11n mary guides to c urrent judicial moral 
t h i n ki n g, by which I mean t. h ,\l they set out the normative conrlusions 
yielded by the judge ' best pn.:sent unclet st.anding of the balance of rnoffll 
principles. I t is true that, because the balance of principles takes account 
or sttch mauers as prediruJ.bility and systemic consistency, such rules could 
;:tcquirc a certain idcrui ty and conti nu i ty over tintc that might seem 10 
re. emblc the independent status of tl'\tC' autonomous rules. The reason for 
this is that the conservative "drag'' of' the ntle-of-law v;;dues ensures that a 
given rule is not immediately modi fied or abandoned just because the 
judiciat)''s ''iew of the relevan t substantive pr i nciples has shifted. 
�U.  Tim i� r tol ar t  t t t tcur tu·o,·cr.� ra l  .t�st u n p t ion; sec 1 1 1/JI'rt note 1 7. 
2 1 .  Th..-tc is, ot course . a pt oh lt·m 1J I '<C>Ik t h <tl atisc·� hc:rt:, ��ltich can be; clc�n ibt'd i l l  
thl· followrng w;1y: What .-:,acll>· i,� n.JIIt prthcrHkcl by the phr a.sc',  "the total .set  of t..ll'I'<JIH and 
hi"ding : tlllonorllol.ls legal rule�"� J., 1l tht· c 11 t r rc con l l tltJII law� Is it r ht· c: n lirt• c o m rn c JII bw 
trtgt•tht:r ll'i t l t  all otlter aUIOJ1CJI))(llt> lt'�.tl I l i l t'\, i n· l t rding in r<�r tkular t l tost' cn:ntt:d I))' 
l egi�l;uiou? O r i� i 1  pe1 h:tps �01111' suh�t:l rof the· Ct>lll i1WII l.tw. �ltch as. 1 1 1 ..til ;•ppropr i.ut: 1 asc-, 
tht: 1 .11\' nl  ltll t.'? Ur rs it �f>llll' �1i l l  � 1n ;dkr  ��·t n( 1 ule>? '!'ht.:�,. a 1 ..:  m H  tjll t:stions thilt nec.-d tP 
ht: i:idcltc:��ed tor pt r:�.;nt p111j)•l�c�. Sl· · ·  furt l te 1  Ro11a1,1 l)wvrkin, Law's Empirt- :!50·54 ( 1 :JHlt) 
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)J onetheles , the fac t  remain thctt the status and cont e n t  of a summary 
rule at all times tracks the underlying balance of principles, where that 
balance is understood to embrace (among other p tinc iples) the 
conservatively-i ncli ned ru le-of-law values. Now it rnight seem that on this 
accou nt of the role of principles in  legal reason in g, the pri nc i ples at stake 
are really moral, not legal, in nature. There is a sen ·e in which this is true, 
but, as I shall shonly argue, there is also a sense in which the underlying 
principles arc properly characte rized as legal. For the m o m e n t, if on ly to 
ensure that we have a convenient  label ,  le t  me call th is  the normative 
primacy model of legal pri nc iples,  or the primacy model for short. 
Notice that both the rationalization and primacy models of legal 
pri n c iples preserve the three general charactcri · tics of pr i nci ples that were 
noted at the beginning of Sec t i o n  I. These concerned, i t  will be recal led, 
the logical character of prindplcs, their r:ome n t, and t heir justificaLOry 
relationshi p wi th rules. Thus, in both models, prin ciples pos ess the logical 
properly of weight rather th an that of conclusiveness. In both the ir content 
is value-oriented, alt hough in thl' case of the rationaliJ.ation model the 
relevant values might be, so to speak, second-best ones. And finally, in both 
models princ i p les justify rules rather than vice versa. The diflcrence 
between the two models conct:rns a further aspect of the relationsh ip 
between rules and pri nc iples , which I will  refer to as the issue of nonnative 
priority. The issue arises, in our n oncpistemically transparen t  world, when 
the just ificatory relationshi p that was previously bel ieved t o  hold between a 
rule and the relevan t b:tlance of principles is no longer thought Lo exist.  If 
a new jus t i ficatory relationship is to be established, there are two 
pos::ii bilities. The first is to retai n the rule and modif)' the princ iples that 
figure in the balance of principles .  The second is to give priori ty Lo ( the 
current understanding of) the balance of p1inciples, and to modify the 
rule accordingly. The rationalization model of legal pr in c iples, which goes 
hand-in-hand with the autonomous conception of legal ntlcs, fol lows the 
first strategy. The prit nacy rnodcl of legal principles. which is the nat11ral 
correlate of the sumn1 1na t)' conception of legal rules, follows lhe second. 
The issue of nonnative prior ity i. thus concerned with establishing a fixed 
starting point for rejigging the just i ficatory relationship between ntles and 
pri nciples. The balance of pr inciples i tself constltutes that starting po in t  
fo r the t h e  primacy model, whereas fo r t he rationalization rnodel the 
starting point is the rule. 
We now come to a crucial i ·sue. How can i t  be said that, o n  the 
pri1nacy model, we an: dealing wi th principles t hat  a 1e  properly re garded 
as legal, and no t just moral, i n  nature? 1\ftcr all,  the basic ch aracterization 
of the primacy model seems t o  begin preciselr with the idea of a balance 
of moral principles, where that bal.mce )s uncle1 stood to include certain 
values, surh as predictabi l i ty and consistency, th at fa\'Or the stall!S quo. In 
order to answer the preceding question we nc:f·cl to ask the following one: 
how 1.. xactly cto t h<:s� c:onservat i ,·c values figure in the balance of 
principles? Notice th,H the)( do no t sectn lapabk o r  be i n g  taken into 
accnunt rlirerlly. bec.uts;· th�y do n t l l  hav<.: �l clcrcrm i n a t c  content of their 
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own. They do not,  if you li ke ,  pull in a particu lar sub tantivc dircc(ion. 
Consistency and predictabil i ty req ui re a substant ive contem upon which to 
operate, and they arc compatible With a wide varie ty of such conten ts. I n  
legal reason ing they underpi n  the doctrine of precedent, which determi nes 
a content by focussing on insti tu tional his tory. More particularly, precedent 
focusc:; on the reasoning in earlier cases and demand.s, in a com mon ly­
employed i diom , that we attribute greater weight to t h at reason i n g than we 
might otherw·ise be i ncl i ned to do. 
I want to suggest that the idiom of at tributing we ight to the reasoning 
of past decisions is one that we should t ake seriou ly. One way to 
understan d this notion is along th� fo ll owing lines. The princ i ples that 
make l iP the doc t ri ne of preceden t  arc second-order princi ples that require a 
court to attribute a cer tain weight to thl;! J.irst-order principles that J.igured 
in previous legal decisions, even if the present court disagrees with how the 
earl ier court reached ils COl'lclusion. �J The reaso ning employed in a prior 
case can stil l be modi fied or even r�jccted, but not as readi ly as it could 
have been if it had never been accurded j udicial recognition at all. The 
fir t-order pri nciples that figured in that reasoning arc transformed. 
through this process of acquiring a certain offic i al status, into legal 
principles. There arc various ways to understand this process/' but the 
most plausible is an cpislemic i n tecpretation. On this view, the re::�soning 
of the previous court is 10 be treated as pre tunptively correct, but the 
presumption is  defea ·i ble. (The summary rules that the reaso ni ng is taken 
to j ust ifY then operate as defeasible presumptions themselves.) The pre sent 
court is enti tled to mo dify or rej ect thC:' reas()ning of the earlier coun when 
it believes, with at least a cenai n degree of con fi dence , th at t he earlier 
22. (;J Pet ry, furl it irtl OhltJiflllfuJ. HlfJirL nol<: l li . .Jl 239-:J.). 
2�. C/. Perry. Smniii-OtdYr Hl'fl lo'"· .Ill/'"' nou: Hi, a1 932·36, 96li-68. One way 10 
\tl ldCrsl:'lnd t he 1101ion of a S('c<'ltHI-ordt·r pri nc iple Is ;u a gc•ncrali7:Jtion of Rat's no t ion of a 
sc·cortcl-order tcason. Fut Raz. a second-order t ensun i� " rcnson lo an u t t ,  or 1101 to act on. a 
lirsvordc•r re<ISon. On the gcnc.:r:llized unckrst;-�udi ng, a sccond-orckr n·ason IS :� rc(l�on 10 
treat a first-order n::1son as having a dcgrn· of we1gh 1 which diffns fro1n rht' wei ghr orw 
wuulct ulltnwi e anr1burr to it. rhc idea <Jf "w<•ight" ClH\, howcv�:r .  Ia: ••mlerstoocl in l' ithcr a 
subSLantiw 01 :In t'pisrcmic scnsc. The �uhsta n l ivc weight of a plinc1pk ts the.: ,,c.;:ghr 1 ha1 i� 
au ribt tted to it in pr<�criral reasoning. in r h c  process of as.�e�ing lht· ovc.:t·al l  b:llanc �· uf 
reasons. Epi ·r<·tnic: ll'<'ight  is rhc degree of l'Onfid�::ctcc 1ha1  one milS! hilvc i n  onc:'s belief !hill 
the plinciplc h.1� h c rl'tofot been inco11 cr!ly fo mntlawd before a prt·sumption 111 fOI\'Cll of dw 
pnuriph·'s ( I I W t <t ll  corr·cctness c�u\ b<· reiJU!lt'd. ("Motal  col t cct ness" rlltlu:t ns, i n  rh i� 
context. br>lh the� content C>f a principle :tml m .o,I I IJstcl ll l ivc weight.) On a "!)llhsrantive" 
intcrprct:tlit)ll of t he 1 101 ion of a S<'C<IIHI·I)ttlt:r pdncipk. i1 is  suh,l:lll ti\'c Wl·t�hl th:n i� 
assumed In h1· \:trial>lt:: t h us :tn l'xcl1 1siorury ' c,hr'ln '' jttH the special case of <1 reason to 1 n·a 1 
a fi rst-o rder t t>ii�On <IS havi ng zero weigl t t . B11 1  an '\·pisrc.:rnir" i t H (•rp r cta r i o n is nlso pCJ�siblc, 
ince, a� we .'llt:l l l  s1'r .�hortlr. rhc requir'crl dq;1 �::c uf c:nnliclcun· i t l  onr's own ptcSt'lll tnor.d 
beliefs ran l'ary. so thai t l  mak�::s sense: tn .spc;\1.;. llf .1U tiiJu!111g a grcal<'r or le�scr cpt�lerr l lr 
weight In the t c le\'l"ITll pri n c i p l e .  ,\l  om· tHnt· 1 1  s«:<'tl led to "''" that borh rhe mbq:'ltHiW and 
cpisrc111ir imcrprc.:rations tJt the g-cnnal17.cd 1101ion ul ::1 �t'C lJtld-orclc:r t easo11 wcte pq�s1hk: 
sec ir/. I lowew: 1 .  I now h<tVl' some do11h1.) :'lbt•tll  t l w  ,·ultt•rt·ltC<' of rlu: � t t l m,tnrtl'.: i n r e r  pn·ra­
l ion . <tnd h:-t\<.' the-n·forl' c nnlinerl cli�l'����rr>n 111 t l w  text l() !I ll' t'pt�l•·mic unckr �1:111d11l r:. 
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court was in some respect mistaken . For example, the present court might 
have to be convinced that the earlier court was clearly, or plainly, wrong 
before it  would be entitled to modify the Iauer's formulation of the 
balance of principles.N But in the ab encc of this degree of confidence, a 
mere belief that the earlier court reasoned mistakenly will not justify such 
a move. 
We can refer to the degree of confidence required to ,-ebut the 
presumption that the rea oning in :m earlier rlcci ion is correct as the 
epistemic threshold. Because confide nce in the correctness of one 's present 
beliefs is a mauer of degree, the epistemic threshold need not be regarded 
as fixed. In the legal con text we could expect it to vary according to a 
number of factors, such as the status in the judicial h ierarchy of the 
present court relative to that <>f the earlier court, the age of the releva nt 
precedent, and the nature of the case.2·� Suppose, for example , that the 
older a precedent that has not fallen into desuetude is, and the more 
frequen tly it  has survived earlier ch allenges, the more confident th e 
present court mu ·t be that the reasoning underpinning the prccedem is 
mistaken before it can revise or reject that reasoning. If that is true it  
makes sense to speak of tht: principles th a t  figured in an ear lier court ' s  
reasoning, as wdl  as the summary rule that the reaso ning i s  taken to 
justify, as becom ing more and more entrenched over time. The idea that 
pri nc iples and ntles become entrenched in the common law is a very 
fam iliar one among lawyers. It is an idea that, within the primacy model of 
legal pri nciples, can easily be given an explication in epistemic terms , 
along the l i nes just sketched. I shall, accordi ngly , refer to this phenomc· 
non as episternic entre nchment. Although it is not my purpose i n  th is essay 
24. S<T, lor cxa111plc, O'B1 ir'll v. f<uhimon, 1 973 App. Cas. 9 1 2  ( 1- I.L. ) :  
While i t  wuul c..l be opc>n t o  �ou1 Lotchhips t o  do �o. th is i s  not, I t h i n k ,  a su itab le 
r:1sc 111 which to excn;isc.: the 1 <.:tcmly assc>rted power of thi House to n:fu�c: to 
f<Jllow one of as uwu prt:\'ious dc.:cisions. An c:x<uui nation or the reasontng tn tht· 
judgments i n  the r.:m:s on t h is subject during the las t  hundred yc::lrs suggc.:sts that tiH; 
law might l"a.�ily have.: dc\'<.:loped on d i ffe rent li nes from those which it in  fact 
fullowed. lhtt ,  for 111y part, I �1rn not persuaded t l 1al this dcvcloprnc11t w:u clearly 
wrong or lc.'ads to a·su lts which arc ch·:1rl)' tnvust . . . .  
/ti. at 930 (Lord Diplock); .lt!r oLw fitzlcct Estates Ltd. v .  Chcrry. [ 1 977] � All E.R. 99u, 1000 
( l l .L.)  ("lf the decision i ll t i l!" Chml l'l!ry /,nlll' C;l<C' was wrong. it ccn.:�inly wa� not so clc(lrly 
wrong ::tnd ptoductiv�: <Jf i l ljusti<.c a.s to l l lflk<' it right for the l louse to de pa r t from i t .")  
(Viscour\t Dilhorn�'). 
25. (/ Pci'P.J.)Wlirilll OhliKfllimt, .\ 11/Jrll nute llj, nt :l· l l -l�. In speaking of "the l la ture of th<: 
ctu<:," J l t:t\'<: in  mind tW•J thi ng.�. Fir·H.  �tability and prcd in;1bil ity mi ght be more important in 
sornt· nrc·.•s of Lite law th:ul in othc". Thus we should ('Xpcct <1 higher epistcmic t h reshold in 
con trar t rase:.. whet e lqpl rule� at c intended i 11 pat t to fat i llt;\lc the s ll uct u r ing of con�t usual 
t e lationships, t h.11 1 in turt ( <��es (or at lea�t i l l  trJt't ca8cs irwolvin� i n voluntary hann between 
sit  angers).  $t'ronrl. w�· should expect t he episternic th 1 eslrolcl tO vary in,-rrst:ly wtlh tlw degree 
ot pcrcci\'ed tnjustirc of !Itt' ptc:�ent legal rute (or, nltt' l ttat ively, with the extent of the b:1d 
((lllscqilcttces for which i t  is thought tu be respottsihk). Thus the threshold sho11ld, nll t h ings 
h . • t ng c.:qu:�l. be !own for n ni le  tl 1;\ l i �  tl liJ\Ight to i11vnlw g1 cat i n j 1 1slicc tl titll f'or one: tli:'tt is 
( l tul lgltt  w i l l \ohe ordy �umr: k��(·r dq�n:�: 11f \\' l fJJig. 
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w offer a detailed compar ison of Lhe primacy and rationalization models, i t  
is worth remarking that, wi thin the latter model, no comparably 
straigh tfo nvard explanation of the manner i n  which pri nciples become 
entrenched in the Jaw appe ars to be available. 
If we make the further, quite plau sible assumption that on the 
primacy model the e pistemic thrc hold will vary with the ex ten t of the 
ch ange in the law that the pres e n t court is contemplaLing, then th at model 
can al o readi ly explai n the fact that,  in the common law, low-level legal 
c hange occurs more or Jess constan tly. Suc h change becomes possi ble , and 
indeed is to be expected, if a , iudgc requi res only a moderate degree of 
con fidence in her present moral beliefs before she is enti tled to introduce 
mi nor changes-i nvolvi ng, say, the modest expansion or restr iction of the 
scope of a sumn1ary rule-intO :1 prior l i ne of legal reaso ning. The 
existence of conLinual,  low-level change is, however, very difficult to 
account fo r when, as on the alttonomous con cep tion of legal rules, 
analogues of the formal legislative no ti ons of amendment and repeal must 
be invoked. Thtsc notions seem w he most at home when rnajor change in 
the law, such as the overruling of an important precede nt, is at stake . But 
while the posi tivist tec h nique of t:on u·ucting analogues of amendment and 
repeal is one way to anal yze ove r ru li ng and other m�0or changes in the 
common law, it is not the only way. On the primacy model, an overru l i ng 
can be characterized as a revis ion of the reason i ng underlying a prt:vious 
decision Lhat is so extensive tha t en::n the result m ust be regarded as 
mistaken; if  a similar case were Lo be heard now, the decision would go the 
othe r way. This kind of m3:Jor cha nge in the law is a relatively rare and 
signific ll. n t event because, acco rding to the model,  t he epistemic threshold 
that must be met in these c i rc:umst.tnces is cxtrt:mcly high. In general , and 
all other thing.; being equ.tl, the greater the extent of the <.:ontcmplatcd 
change in the Jaw. rhe higher the cpistemic t h reshold. 
I have argued that  t h e  rule-of-law values do not pull in any particular 
substantive dir('t:tio n , and hence c annut he fir t·ordcr principles in Raz's 
sense; rather,  they must be seeond-order princi ples which operate 
parasitically upon lhc tirst-ordet princ iples that have figured in the 
reaso n i n g  of p:ua decisions.�'' One mig-In be tc.:mptcd to make the 
followi ng response to this  argument. �7 Perhaps the ntlc-ot�law valu es can 
2G. An c:trlitr forll1u1;lllon that I g:11e <Jf lilt.� idt:il in Perry. }lllill'llll Ohlignlicm, !11/Hfl 1 \()tt· 
16,  wa� triticiwd by lkidi l l t1 1 d  on t lw g1 <Jll l lll� rh:11 i t  w<�� ju�t .1 vad;1nt un Ra:(s c.onception 
nf justi fit·rl .utthoril}' . .lnd he net: vttlnci<IiJk In :� u i ttqu�: similar t o  Ollt: shc had offtrt·d of 
R.1z. Su llcid1 M. Hurd, Clwllmt,•HIK ,\ttllwul). 100 Yah· l .j. 1 6 1 1 ,  1 6:39�10 ( 19�1 1 ) .  But it was 
nevcr my tntc:n tion rn ofle1 :111 :tl'<'<Jt t l l l  qf .nnlwt il)', t· lllwr Ju�ulied ' '" de f:1cto. fht.: bn�ic 
thesis hns a1wnys hc:t:n. r;H11t:l . 1h:'ll tntillfl vnluc:s 11 h id1 llitgltr  tn he tal:. . .  n in1o atcount in t h t: 
llnlancc- of r c.>::lsons. namely, 1 h r>  nll•·-Qf·1�•w , , lues, cot ll l lot pluu�ibly b(' !'C!f-l! dt:d otr. ordina1y 
first·O tder rc;Hom. Th ..:st· l'i t l t lt:S art: i n stt·;HI IJc,c U IHh:rstood ::1!> s•·corHh>rclt.:r n:a�ons; th t:)' M<', 
n cfTen, fu ntli{'ln> th.tt 1:1ke as ..ttgulll,· r ltS r h c  lir�l-l t tkr prinlipk� dt.ll h;ll't' figured i n  
ltclici<\1 re:��•1tl i n �  ill tht· �'::l'l .  
27. Cj Alt.::-:nncler & Krc��. W/JIIt note 17 .  tl 2�1f\. J09. tr/111111111 w X;? l()wn L.  Rn. '7:!9, 
i%, 7119 ( I 997 \ .  
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be given effect through the consequenct!s of prior decisions. and in 
particular through the expectations they ge nerate and the rel iance they 
induce. Both expectation and reliance involve a judgmen t  that t h e  fulllre 
will fo llow a panicular course; more spec ifically, in the judicial context ,  
they a surne t hat fu ture decisions wil l  (alway·. usu�dly. or ofte n )  resemble 
past ones. Considered as reasons for action for judges, expec tations and 
reliance, unlike the rule-of-law value standing alone, thus do pull in a 
particular direc tion. This suggests, i n  turn, that they are ordin ary, first­
order reasons. If that is so, however, then there seems to he n o  need to 
have second-order principles in the sys tem: to the extent that the past has 
a bearing on what should be done in the present, this can apparently he 
accomplished if judges take direct account of expectations and reliance in 
the overall balance of first-order principles. 
The problem with this response is that expectations give rise to 
legitimate first-order reasons only i f  they arc justified; similarly, reliance 
creates reasons only if i t  is reasonable. Ordinarily, however, expectaLions 
are not j ustified, nor is reliance to be regarded as reasonable, unless the 
expectations wert! knowingly encou raged or the reliance deliberately 
induced. I may have an expectation that .Judge _ lul i:1  wi l l  always ntle in my 
favor, and I may take action in reliance on the assumption that she will do 
so, but un less my expectation has been officially encouraged i r  should 
count fo r nothing in her rea on ing. The judicial system e nco urages people 
to form expectations, and invites them to rely on those t:xpectations, by 
means of the doctrine of precedent .  That doctrine must therefore be 
formu lated and just ified, i n i tial ly at least, independently of persons ' 
expectations and the fact of their reliance. But this takes us righ t back to 
where we started. The only plausible j t ts titication th<tt can be offered for a 
judicial practice of following pr<;:cedent will look t o  the ru le-ot�law 
��� . 
values; nnd m a legal system based on summ,\ry rules those values take 
effect, 1 have argued, through the operation of second-order pri nci ples. Of 
cour e, once a practice of fo llowing prccedcm is i n  place, there may be a 
kind of feedbac k effect: the j ustified expectations and the reasonable 
re l iance to which the practice give rise arc first-order reasons that should 
indeed be taken inw accou n t  in t he overall balance of principles.  I discuss 
this fu nher in the following section . The poim to be noted for pn:sent 
purposes, however, is tll<ll .wi t hout an i n clcpcndcnt ly:i ustifh:cl doctrine of 
precede nt,  these rc::..sons will never be generated i n  the first place. 
Accordi ng to the primacy modt.:l, then. a legal principle begins i ts 
career i l l  law as a met e moral prin ciple, or, more accurately, a�; a standard 
of prac :iral reaso ning that relevant mclllhcrs of the judici ary reg:1rd as a 
correct moral principle. As a res u l t  o f  having figured i n  earl ier leg-al 
reasoning, i t  ty·comcs subject to a presumptiun in favo r l )f its ntoral 
28. It i� illl(lOrtalll liN tv conru 3 �: cxpt:U:IIion� 1\'llh t lh· l ll lt--Cif·law l"aluc� of P' �:cliu.thilill' 
:1 1 1 rl ,,;� h i l i ty; lhc lnnncl· :11·e p�vcholn�iral Sl<l lt--' of p.-rsf) I\S, "'hl.'t c;oo; r ile: l n l l� l  •I I <.:  �c·nc·t .tl 
ck,id<· t ala o n :, lt-g;1! '>)S\t"llo. 
TWO MODELS OF LEG;\L PRiNCIPLES 80 1 
correctness; "corrcCLness," i n  this context, comprehend · both content and 
substantive wcight.2� Because of the importance of such conservatively­
inclined values as consi tency and predictabili ty, the presumption itself is 
generally assumed to be, and in basical ly just legal systems usually wi l l  be, 
morally justified. The epistemic strength of the pres umpt i on will vary with 
a number of different institutional factor , such as the number of ti mes the 
principle has figured in prio r judicial opinions, the seniori ty of the 
deciding co urts , and the age of the precedents. The s tron ger the 
presumption, the greater the degree to which the pri nc ip le can be said to 
be entrenched i n  the law. 
It is the existence of the epislcmic threshold, and the accompanying 
phenomenon of ep istcm ic entrenchment, that makes it plausible to say 
that the principles described by the pt·imacy model arc legal and not just 
moral i n  nature. This is true fo 1- t\"10 reasons. First, the degree of 
entrenchment i a function of prior institutional history; it is a fu nction, in 
other words , of spec ifi cally legal events that wok place in the past. Second, 
the fact of entrenchment permits legal reaso ning to be at least partially 
autonomous, by which I mean th e fo llowing. While legal reasoning i!i, on 
the primacy model, ·upposcd to track moral reasoning, it fas tens on a 
particular instance of moral argu mentation as the official fo rm of 
reasoning to be appli ed i n  a given type of case. Subseq uent courl.S must 
fo llow and fu rther develop this form of reasoning, even if that is not  what 
they would do if the matter were tah ula rasa, so long as their disagreement 
falls within the bounds of the relevant cpistemic threshold. It is importan t 
w emphasize, however, that on this view the autonomy of legal reasoning is 
only partial; if j ud�cs :\re suffic ien t ly onfidem that an eadie r court was 
mistaken, then they can, to an extent that will vary with the circumstances, 
rely on their presen t moral belief: to decide the case al bar and, in the 
process, change the law. What such reliance involves can range from a 
min or modification of the existing formulat ion of the balance of principles 
to a complete repudiation of the earlier colin's  reasoning, of the kind 
involved in an overru l i ng. 
IV. t\J'J EXA�viPLE 
This is all very abstract, so let  me try to elucidate both the 
rationalization and the primacy models of judicial princ iples by way of an 
example. Suppose t h at, in a case of tirst i nst.m cc, a judge has tO decide 
whether to order a pregn ant  woman who is addic ted to drugs to e n ter i n to 
a treatment program. To keep the example s i 1 t 1 ple,  I will assume that  there 
are no relevant $Latutc · and t h a t the issue is to be dealt with solely as a 
matter of f'Ommon law, underswod in its broadest sense ( i.e., under toed 
as including do<:lrint!s of equjty and all inh erent  powers and prerogatives 
of the col!J l ) .  Let me furt her assume, again to ktep t h e  example simple, 
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that there are only three (potentially) relevant principle· .  These concern 
the mother's interest, the fetu 's interest (if any), and the general 
community's interest (if any) . The mother's interest, we may assume, is 
grounded in her autonomy: i t  i against her i n terest to he taken into care 
against her will. We shall fu rther assume that the fetus's i nterest is in 
avoiding physical injury (which in this ca c would be caused by drugs ) .  
However, the existence o f  that in terest , o r  at least its weight, depends o n  
whether the fetus i s  a per on;  fo r the purposes of the example (as well as 
in real life ) ,  that issue is to be regarded as controversial. Finally, we shall 
assume that, so far as the general co m mun i ty is con cerned, one of the 
following three possibilities holds , but it is controversial which one: (i) the 
community has no moral interest in the mauer; (ii) the commun ity has an 
instrumental in terest only, predicated on a more basic i n terest in 
minimizing health care costs: or ( i i i )  the community has an inherent 
i nterest in protecting not just actual but also potential human life from 
serious physical injury. 
Suppose the case just clcsctibed comes before judge Ja per.  The drugs 
the mother is taking give rise to a serious risk of severe brain damage at 
birth. Given our assumption that the case is one of first instance-! sha11 
also assume, aga in for the ake of simplicity, that no relevantly similar 
issues have previously been deal t with by the coun-:Jaspcr must make a 
decision based on his assess ment or the balance of moral pri nciples. A'i the 
example has been set up, there are several controve rsial eleme n ts  in that 
balance, so the decision could reasonab ly go either way. Suppose that 
Jasper believes very strongly that the fetus is not a person and that i t  
therefore has n o  inte rest that can directly outweigh the moth er's  autonomy 
i nlcrest. But .Jasper nonetheless dec ides thal the mother shou ld he ordered 
tu enter rreaU11ent, on the grounds that t h e  community has an interest i n  
the mat ter  i n  the cnsc of proposition ( i i i ) ;  i n  .Jasper' opinion,  that 
interest outweighs the mother's autonomy i n terest in the circumstance::; of 
the case. 
On the rationalization model of legal principles, which is the nip side 
of the autonomous conception of legal rules, Judge Jasper· s decision would 
be regarded as having created a new auLOnomous legi'\l rule. Suppose the 
rule is: a pregnant woman who i n tends to carry her fetus to term, and who 
is addicted to drugs that po c a re<tl risk of serious physi ca l hann to the 
chi ld when born, may be ordered hy the court to enter a treatment 
program. Suppo e now that  .1 case come · berore Judge Julia i n  which the 
addiction is to a less serious drug, one which threatens o n ly a fairly remote 
po ·siblity of sontc hearing loss later in l it<:.  Julia's case does not fall withiu 
Jasper's rule, since the ri�k of i njtny is low and the injury itself lesli serious 
in character. Let me assume. again to keep the example as simple as 
possible,  that Jul ia cannot ov<.:rmk Ja!>pcr's  det:isic.m. But, ot t  the 
rationalilation model of legal pt incip les,  her decision must still cohe:rc 
with the rule he !aiel clown, and this mean · that she rnt1st decide the 
present rase in accu1 dance with the p1inciples that, i n  her \ iew, bc:n jusi.ify 
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Julia thinks the result in Jasper 's case may or may not have been 
right ,  but at any rate she docs disagree with his re asoni ng. In her opin ion . 
i t  docs not seem appropriate to say th(lt the commu nity has an interest in 
the matter in the sense of proposition (ii i ) .  This is because she docs nut 
believe that, mo rally speaking, the commun ity could have standing lO 
in terfcrc except to protect actual, not j u · t potc n tial, h urn an life. Julia fee 1 · 
even more stron gly that the commun ity has no interest at stake iu the 
sense of proposi tion ( i i ) ;  in her view, if financial cost to the community 
could ever outweigh the mother' s autonomy interest, then the com m unity 
would be justified i n  curta ilin g risk-taking as well as risk-imposing behavior 
(e.g., by prohibi ti ng dan ger ous spons because of the med i cal cosLS they 
might i n cur).  But propositions (ii)  and (i i i}  are at least intelligible to Julia, 
in Lhc followi n g  sense. While her curre n t  thinking is that nei ther 
proposit io n is a valid moral principle, she docs not hold that view so 
strongly that she believes she could not he mistaken; t hus she regards both 
propositions as fall ing "'i thin the realm of possible moral principles. This 
means that if Julia had to treat either proposition as the best justification 
fo r Jaspe r 's rule, she would have a fairly good idea of how to assign relative 
weights in specilic circumstances. It is ju t that her curren t \'icws lead her 
to think that the results wo uld be i nappropriate or unpalatable; if 
proposition ( i i)  had normative fo rce, fur example, it might mean that the 
state could prohibit people from e ngagi ng in dan gerous activities. She is 
aware, however, that others might not took as askance on this state of 
affairs as she docs. 
Julia thus move on to co nsider the possi b i li ty that the fe tus is a 
person ("the personhood thesis" ) .  As a moral matter she is rather inclined 
to doubt that this is true, but she i in a state of great un cenaimy about 
the issue. She thinks it is at lca�t arguable that the fe tus is a person , and 
she has a fairly good idea of how that tht: ·i · could be tnacle to cohere with 
her more fi rmly-held moral beliefs. Given that she regards the personhood 
thesis as morally more pl aus ible than either proposition ( ii )  or proposit io n 
( ii i ) ,  Julia concludes that it ofrcrs the best justification fo r the rule in 
jasper's case and so ho lds in hN jucl�,rmc n t . According to the rationllliza­
tion model of legal principles, the thesis that the fc tll$ is a person emerges 
from juli a' s reasoning as a legal principle .  I n  the part ic ular case before her. 
juli a holds that, while she must regard th<; fe tus as a person, the mother ' s 
autonomy imercst none thcles outweighs the ('e;:tus·�  i n teres t i n  avoiding a 
fairly rt:motc risk of pa rLial hearing los� later in lift.: . .J ulia the refore rules 
that lhe mother cannot be ordered i nt o  u·eatmenL 
30. for puq>osc� of simpll�ity, I am ,1ssu1ning 1 11.11 the St;.ltl·d rule is the on I: ;tutOntlllllHls 
rule llMt is both b111ding on .Julia ;-�nct rckv.tt l t  to t ill' '>f>t' of CIS<:' in  qucqiun, ,tud ht·nn: tht­
only ntc mhc r of the .�ct of nill·s for whlf'h f l lh :t 1 1 1 \ht,  11 t 1 hin t h e:  IJtiol\;dj,,uic>n wudc l .  find 
the bc·st justilicat ion, O n thr llf'li11n of relt:,::t tlt and b i ndtng- i i i i iCJI10tlllHIS 1 1 1 lt.� . . �n� Jll/lm nntt'  
2 1 .  
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Let us turn next to th e primacy model of principles. In the original 
case described above, invo lvi ng a moth er who lakes drugs that pose a 
serious risk of brain. dam.age to her child at birth, assume that Jasper rules 
as before; he ru les , that is ,  that the mot he r should he ordered into 
treatmem because the community has an in terest i n  protec ti ng potential as 
well as ac tual human l ife, and that th is interest is sufficien t ly slrong to 
ou twe igh t he mothe r's autonomy imerest. Assu me further that t he second 
case, involvin g  a remote risk that the ch ild will suffer some hearing loss 
later in life, again comes before Ju lia's court. On the prim acy model of 
princ iples, Julia is nol conclusively bound by either the reason ing or the 
result in Jasper's case, but she must still give some weight to the rule-of-l aw 
val ues of predictabil ity and consistency. Because these values do not. 
stand ing on their own, pull i n any particular substantive dirccLion, Julia 
can on ly take lhem inLo accoun t by deferring to what Jasper did on the 
earlier occasion. The ciefercncc in question is, however, circumscribed 
rather than absolute. In prac tice , th is means that Ju lia must treat the 
reason ing in Jasper's case as presumptively correct unless her confidence 
that he was mi staken exceeds a certain epistem ic thresh o ld. 
Suppo e the epistemic threshold that app lies in the circumstances is 
that julia must believe that Jasper was cfea·rly wrong before she can make 
any m<�jor clepanures from his reaso n i ng . Suppose further thatJul ia is not 
confide nt  to that degree that Jasper's reasoning was m istake n, even thot�gh 
she docs cl isagr<"e w i t h h im . Then Ju l ia must treat proposition ( i i i ) .  which 
states that the community ha an inte rest in protecting po tent ia l as wel l as 
actual human life, as a legal pri nc ip le .  (Notice that. on the primacy rnodel,  
candidates [or lega l principlehood emerge from the reaso n in g of the earlier 
court, whereas, o n  the rationalization mode l ,  i1 is the reasoning of the later 
coun t hf1t determine wh ich pri nc i ples will have legal stalll s . )  For purposes 
of lega l reason i n g-i.e., practical reason i ng in the c o n text of formal 
adjudicati on-Julia m ust l 11 us reas on as though proposition ( i i i )  were a 
so und moral pri n c i p le po�sessing a certain degree of substantive moral 
we igh t . She can do this because the pr iuci plc is, in the sense noted earl ier, 
perfectly in telligible to her; once she acccpL<i the premise that it has an 
official s tatu� in legal reasoning, she has a good sense of how to proce-ed . 
Thus she quite readily comes to t h e  concl us io n that the principle' s 
substantive weight cannot pl aus ibly be regarded as sufficient tO defeat the 
Hto thcr's auw nomy interest in the case at presen t before her. The 
community interest in protect ing a poten 1 i al human l ife from a fairly 
remote risk of partial hearing loss laler in l ife cannot outweigh the 
motht;r ' s  i n terest in u o t  being fo rced in to a trealnteJH program against her 
will .  
Suppose thf\l ,  iu order to make mi11or departures Crom Jasper's 
reasoning, the requisite epistctnic threshold req u ires o n ly that jul ia be 
(nil!)' confident t h at Jasper has made a m is take. St�pposc f\trthcr t h at, i n  
the earlier c<tsc;; , Jasper had stated that  proposi ticm ( i i i )  i s  a very wei ghty 
princ i p le and. a n t i c i pa ti l lg a fu ture case l ike . lu l i ?. ' s ,  npi!H::cl t h :.1.t even if the 
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future risk to the fetus were remote, propos i tion ( i i i )  would still outweigh 
the mother's auwnomy interest and justify the co u rt ' s  requit-ing her to 
enter into a trea tme n t  program. Allhough Jul ia is not sufficiently confident 
of her own view to be able to say th iH Jasper was clearly wrong in treating 
proposition ( i i i )  as a princ iple that has any ap pl ication at all to th is general 
category of cases, she is Jairl)' sure that h e  at least overstated that 
proposition's we ight . Thus she mod ifies the scope of Ja per's reasoning so 
that i t  applies more narrowly than on his own formulation. She holds thflt, 
when the only risk to the fetus is a remote risk of part ial hear ing loss later 
i n life, the community i n terest in protecting poten t ial human l ife from 
harm is not strong en(Jugh to j ust ify forcing the mother into a treatment 
program agai nst her wil l .  
Up to this poi n t l have been assuming that Julia disagrees with 
Jasper' s reasoning in the earlier case, but doe not strenuously d isagree. 
She feels that, despite her disagreement, his decision iu the actua l case fe l l  
wi th in what we migh t  call an appropriate range of plausibility; she was thus 
required to treat proposi tion ( i i i )  as a legal princ ip le i n  relevantly sim ilar 
cases. Suppose the summary rule that emerged from Jasper's decision (and 
from subsequent deci ions al ong the l i nes of the one attributed to julia in 
the preceding paragraph ) is that a pregnant woman carrying her fe tus to 
term may be taken into care by the s tate when her conduct poses a re nl 
r isk of serious physica l harm to the child after i t  is bo rn . This rule operates 
not as a strong ly conclusive norm, but rather as a presumption . That 
presumption will prevail so long as judges continue to regard the 
underlying rcasoni l lg as fal l ing wit h i n  the appropriate range of plausibility. 
Suppose now that j ldi a's disagreement wit h  Ja per is more serious than was 
earlier assumed to be the ca ·e. Suppose she docs not think that his actual 
dec ision f(�JI wit h in the appropriate range of pl aus ibi li ty; she bel ieves, in 
other words, that he was clearly wrong in ru l i ng as he did. Suppose, fmally, 
that  a case essen tial ly similar to Ji1sper's  original case, involving behavior 
oo the pan of the mother that poses a real risk of serious physica l harm to 
the fetus, comes before Julia. She is faced wit h Llw quesl ion of whether shc 
shou ld overrule Jasper. 
Before we consider what .Julia ought to do i n  these circumstances, we 
shoul d first make r i l e  fol lowing oh:;ervation. In a hierarchical ju dicial 
system with d i ffe rent levels tlf couns, sy<�temic  consistency anct predictability 
can only he ntai ntainecl if  there nrt: l imits on the extent to which jud!{CS 
are able, even within the cpistemi<.: rest rictions a l read)' described, to 
rcfonn ulate the reaso ning ;,.ppl icahlc U> a given type of case. The most 
important such l imi t takes the form of what I shall cal l rhc overruling 
con t raim: judges can not UIOdi l}' th � reaso n i ng of previous decisions so 
severely that a case decided b}' a co1 t t r  higher in the j udicial hi erarchy-in 
some systems, at the same l<:vd-wuuld he ovr· rruled . It will  be rc(.lllccl 
front the discussion in the prt.:C (· dinv scc.:ti<m t hat an ovc r ru l in o is best C" 0 
char(Kte rizcd, wi thin the ptim.tcy mode l ,  ;ts sulh a drast ic re\·isiun of the 
pt inc ipl cs i n forlllin3 a previous decisiul\  that  even the rl!s l l ) l.  in the e-arlier 
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case rnust now be regarded as mistaker1. �11 The overruling constraint can,  
perhaps, be regarded as the litniting case of an epistcmic threshold: a 
judge who is bound by the constraint cannot overru le a case to wh ich it 
appli es even if  he or she is absolu tely certain that the earlier court was 
wrong. Let us assume, the refore, that Ju l ia bas the authority to overrule 
Jasper, so long as she is con fident that he was rlearly wrong in rul ing as he 
did. She might have this authori ty either because she si ts on a h igher 
court, or because he r legal system pennits the overru ling of decisions 
taken at the same level i n  the j udi cial h ie rarchy. 
Recall that r am now supposing, contrary to what was assumed earlier, 
th a t Julia disagrees st renuous ly (togelher, lel us say, wi t h a m�ority of the 
other judges on her appella te-level court) with both the reaso ning and the 
resu l t  in Jasper's case: she believes quite strongly that the fetus is not a 
person, and that the commun ity has no interest, i n  the sense of e ith er 
p roposition (i i)  or propos ition (ii i ) ,  in cases of the ki nd we have been 
discussing. That is not e nough by i tself to jusLify julia In immedialely 
overruling Jasper's decision, for there may be other morally relevant 
factors to be taken i n to account. Even though the appropri at e cpistemic 
threshold has been exceeded, Jul ia must still consider whether there are 
any justified expectations that Jasper' s decision may have encouraged, o r  
any reaso nable reliance that i t  may have induced. As was noted i n  the 
precedi ng scct.ion, these arc first-order rea ons that may be generated by 
the very fact  that the courts follow p recede n t. The existence of justified 
expect.ations or reasonable reliance cannot be determinative in itself, 
however, because the doctrine of precedent, in the fotm i t  takes on the 
primacy model of legal pri nc iples, is  not absolute. It  does not guarantee 
that prior decisions wi l l be fol lowed no matter what. Even so, it is proper 
for the legal system to rccognile that people rnay in various circumstances 
have to com miL themselves to a co1.1rse of action on the basis o f  what they 
can expect the courts to do in the fu tu-re, and this is a consi deration that 
should he taken i n to account in the balance of first-o rder principles. 
r\.s it happens , this does not seem to be an im portan t consideration in 
the c ase at  present before Ju l ia, as it  is not clear how any1)ne could 
irrevocably c011 1 1 1 1 i t  themselves, i n  reliance on Jasper's case, in a way that 
would be morally rdevam w Julia's dec isio n . Perhaps as a result  of the 
earlier case some pregnant women 111ight have derided not to Lake drugs; 
but this is surely not a good reason to say that Julia should not now hold 
that w�Hn en whose activities pose a ri ·k for Lhc fetus they arc carryi ng 
nonet heless canrl o t ever be take n i n to care. Nor does the fac t  that  the state 
3 1 .  It <lisO hears mendon I haL :1 suffin.:ntly dr:�stic refonn ulatiOII ur til(: \ll>derlring 
princ.ipk·� could lc:td tfl ::1 rC'd dininon or llac rdn•am iypr uf rase . . \� wa� explained in Scclioaa 
II, a case's type is determined by Lhe gel\ c 1 a l  �lllf l lt lary rule-and hcncr, u l t i n i:Jt,,·ly, by 1lw 
prinClplt-s llntkrlying the rule-rhat we t::lke the t::tse w b.:: govci i it·rl hy. The general rulr.: ha.� 
this eflcc1 bc:c ::111se i t  treat� on l>· cenain ( t}'pcs of) racL� a ... marcai�l to tilt: resolution nf the 
case. If  I he Lh.u .tttt:J·ir::�tion of J(�ln•;�nt f'ntts cllang�s. �o dno·s tilt: ut t:' s tn>c:. This is. how�·vc.:r. 
a CU111pl itat1(JII tliat l o a presen t  purposes wc.: 1 1 1 : 1 )' ignort• .  
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has been led to cxpcc r that it wi l l be able to force women into trcal!Hent 
seem to cou n t  for much moral l}', and the same is true of any expectations 
to t his effect on the part of third pa rties. (There are also good grounds for 
th i nking that the state is not the ort of c n l i ty who c expectations or 
rt:liancc shou ld orclinarily be given very m uch moral weight in any even t . )  
So this case is quite differe nt from ,  say, a con tracts case i n  which the co urt 
is contemplat ing al terin g what count as acceptance of a particular type nf 
offer; in the Iauer situat io n , past reliance on a previously settled 
understanding of contract fo rmation should. cou n t  for qu ite a lot.  lt wou l d 
rhus appear that Julia is in  a po ilion LO overrule jasper's earlier decision 
and hold that no r h reat to the l ife or health of a fe tus can evet· give the 
state sufficient groun ds to t a ke a preg·nant woman imo care against her 
wil l .  
V. DWORKIN ON LEC.'\L PRINCIPLES 
The mo t powe rful advocate of the thesis that leg.d principles have a 
role to play in law and legal reasoning has been Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin 
is ttsually taken, fo r good reason . tu be a proponent of what I have been 
cal li ng the rarional izalion model of legal pri nciples.�? In his anick Hard 
Cmes3:1 and. in h is subsequent j u risprudent ial writings,�� Dworkin has 
defended the thesis t ha t l egal principle · are prin1 arily determi ned by the 
role they play in the bes t just i fic,l l ion of the settled law. The idea l 1 1at such 
a justi ficat ion must lie at the hean of a theoretical accoum of a<.Uuclication 
i one wi lh wh ich Dworkin is now clost:ly ident ified. Tltc princip les tha1 
figure in the H(//d Case:!! rnudcl are not ncccs arlly morally cvrrect 
principles, bu t rather the ki n d I earlier called .;ccond-bes r .  In I /rut/ Cnm 
Dworkin also in troduced the icl('a of jud ic ial decisions having c nactmcrn 
fo rce, which strongly suggests that such deci ·ic,ns are the scmrce of 
<lutonomous legal rules. The idea th:u the "<··r tlccl comJ non law consists of 
such rules is, as we have seen ,  a nar u ral correlate of the :·atiurtalil<lliun 
model of legal p ri n c ip l es . Dworkin docs not insist that 1.he bcstju�Ti lkati · 1 1  
must  fi t  (1/l of the sct l lcd lnw. bu1  o n ly some rather vagucl)' definer! 
proportion of it; in  au:orclancc with this req uirement of l i t  some pre1iuus 
decisions, or t h e nt les they "enact," can bt' rejected as mi�r.tkc.s. On one 
in tcrprel.atiOll of Dworkin ' s  versiun or th l'iH iO J i r!liZation n t ud<.:l , a dccisiCJ!l 
or rule cannot be discarded simply because i l  is t hought to be substan th:cly 
wrong i n  its own t e r ms. lt can uoly be discarded on hvlis t i c  ground:;: to b r­
t rcated as a nt i')takc, the ruiC' u r  dec isio1 1  nit!st fa l l  within that po.rr of the 
set tled l.tw that is 1 10t jus t i fied bv the bc:st j ust i [icaticl l t .  Thi:; is an cspeciall} 
con crvativc un clt:rsrancling of the rational i z.uion 1nodel,  ::,iuce it pb.Ct:$ :l. 
32. s,.,., r.J.[ . •  , \ln.;1ndn ,-:; 1\.1 LSs. \11/Jul 11011.: 1 7. at 23:\.�j, ,.jm!lft•d ''' .�'1 Im�·:\ .. !:t�•. /0.:'1, 
7·13-15 ( 1 9�17). 
33. tit\ I 1<11"\', 1 . .  Re\'. ltl::i7 [ 1 �7:)) ,  , , /nitl/rtl ''' l>1H,, k11 1 ,  f.tkl lll; J;.igl t 1 s  <.;_. , iull�lv, 1 1 1/Jut l\�.olt' 
I ,  a 1 l:! l .  
3·1 .  ,'-i, t: p:ll t i l l ll.\1 1\ I 11\"(JJ I.. i l l ,  \lt/1111 ilt'lr· '2 j ,  , I I  �:.?:1•�>:1. 
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very stro ng constraint  on overruling. Whether it  really 1s Dworki n ' s  
understanding is, however, a ma tter for debate. 1 wi ll take up this poi n t  
below. 
While Dworki n  has clearly come to defen cl some version of the 
rationalization model, his disc ussion of legal principles in h is earliest work 
is in fact  much c loser to the primacy model. Thu · in The Model of Rules I 
he distinguished between substant ive p rinciples, which migh t argue for a 
spccili.c change in the law, and consetvative p rinciples, such as the 
doctrines of prccedem and Jegislat.ivc ·u premacy, which would favor the 
statu. quo. Legislative supremacy was ch aracterized as "a set of princ ipl es 
that req uire the coUI"LS to pay a qual ified de ference to the acts of the 
legislau.tre . " :''' The doctrine of precedent comprised "another set of 
principles re11ecting the equities ;�nd efficiencies of consistency.'' �n 
Dworkin then wrote as follows: 
Consider . . . what someone implies who says that a particular rule 
is bi nding . He may irnply that the rule is affirmatively supported 
by principles the coun is not free to disregard . . . .  If not, he 
implies that any cha nge would be condemned by a combination 
of conscivativc principles of legisla tive supremacy aucl pt·e ccdent 
that the court is not free to ignore. Vet)l often, he will imply both, 
for the conscrvatjvc principles, being principles and not rules, arc 
Ll ually not powerful enough to save a common law rule or an 
aging SL2.lllte that is entirely unsupported hy substantive principles 
the coun is bound Lo respec t .J7 
Dworkin went on to suggest that "a legal obligation exists whenever the 
case supporting an obligation,  in terms of binding legal princi ples of 
various sons, is stronger than the case against it." �H 
Because ptinciples clea rly have nonnative priority over rule in this 
account of adjudication and legal reasoning, it see ms fair to say that  
Dworkin i presenting us with i ns tances of both 1he ·ummary conception of 
legal ru les and tht! pri111acy n J odel of legal principles.3� Moreover we have 
here fairly radical instances of the sum mat)' and primacy approaches , 
be ausc apparemly not even statutes arc regarded as giving rise to truly 
autonomous rules: the principles consti tuting the doc tr ine of legislative 
supremacy require the courts to do no more than pay "a qualified 
deference ·· to the acts of the lcgis latun.: .  Yel, as we have seen, Dworki n ' s  
understan ding of legal principles i n  Hard Coses seems to be n \U c h  closer lo 
the ratio nalization model, and, on al least one interpretation, to a rather 
�!">. Uwork111. T<1king Rights ScdouoiY, 1 11/lrrl note· I ,  ;�t :37. 
:Hi. lrl. 
:-'>7. /,/ at �H�. 
:\� /d. :-tt ·I I .  
:1!1. Ownrl..1n ' �  ITI �inn of 1 he p1 i11l::IC}' mock I is not, howcvc1 , the- ·a1nc: rtS tht· oue put 
forw.1 1d  1 1 1  srniun 1 1 1  above: <HI lh,rJI k in's acronm, the- rr•nsa:IY:-ttin:l)·indi ll�·rl p a i nci pla:s 
l l l ldt · t lylng tht ·  dotll i i\C'S of prct:r:d�: l \ l  a1 Hl lt:gi�l.l l i l r:  >llfHt" l l i : \C:)" :�rc· lll)t rh;u·artr:n7c·d as 
Sr.'t"OIHI<ll dt.:'l 111 n�H\IIC,  nt.ll art: the)' ):IHI to take dTen thrnugh t lw •·pi�tc.: l l lit  t:ll ! l t: n t hntnJ I  
ol ! i 1  ,t-nrrlcl . ���b�t 11 1 1 ivc· Jll llll iple.�. 
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conservative version of the mode l at that. What migh t have led to suc h a 
major ch ange in view? 
I shall  argue below that thi' reorientation in Dworkin's thought may 
not have been as radical as t he precediug paragraph suggests. Even ·o,  it is 
clear, I th i n k, that t here wa at least a shift in em phasis in hi work. To 
understand why t h is might have happened, the key poi n t  to note is that 
throughout hi jurisprudential career D\vo rkin has a l ways emphas ized that 
the principles that figure in legal reaso ning must be con c eived as legal 
rather thau as purely moral i n  nature. Presumably he was concerned that if  
he mai ntained th at pri nci ple-ba ed reason ing was simply moral reason ing, 
then he would not be i n  a posi tion to offe r an internal critique or Han's 
version of positivi m, as he wished lO do. He would simply be opposing 
Hart's posi tivism with a moral th�o1y of a�j udication whic h ,  Han woul d 
claim, bas no bearing on the content of the t h eory or law (or, at least, on 
the conten t of Hart' s theory of law) . The pri nc iples operative in lega l 
reaso ning thus had to be l ega l . not moral, plinciplcs. Dworkin in itially 
suggested that their legal character derived, not from being posited or 
enacted , but rather from "a sense of appropriaten ess deve loped in the 
profession and publ i c  ove r time . '' 111 He wcm on w say that we would back 
up a clai m that a particu lar principle was a legal principle by advert ing w 
i nstances of "institutional support," such as i L'5 c i tat ion in previous cases, 
preambles to statute , and legislative co 1 um i uce reportS. But this suggest ion 
was immediately seized upon by Joseph Raz and others as showi ng t hat 
pri nciples were essen tia l ly an i nstance of custotT I ,  and hence could be 
traced to a posi ti\ist ic social source.�' lf this was true, then princi ples 
were, contrary to Dworki n's  cen tral cla in1, vulnerable to bei n g  identified by 
a sufficien t ly sophisticated version of the rule of recogn ition.  
Thus Dworkin seemed to be caugh t on the hams of a dilemma. If he 
said that  the princ i pl es which figure in legal reaso ning are moral in 
na ture, then he would not be joi n i ng issue wi t h Hart's  posi tivist theory. 
(Hart could i n  fact have read i ly agre ed that non-ru le-based legal reason i ng 
is simply moral reason i ng, which Han \VO uld ch aracterize as the exerci�e of 
judicial discretion and not h i ng more . )  lf, on the other hand, Dworkin aid 
that  pli nc ip les had rhcir source i n  a form of cu tom, then he could be 
accuse d of merely offe ri n g up a modified version of positivism. Dworkin's 
eventual so l u tion w this di l emma was to em phasi ze the ide:t that legal 
principles arc t hose princi ple · ,  moral in Jomt,�� that figu re in the best 
j ustificati on of the settl ed law. Because legal pr inc i ples t h us understood arc 
defined in pan in no nn at ive terms, they do not have the i r  provenance in 
ocial sources alOJH: ,  aud he nce cannot be captured br :'1 ped igree-based 
rul� of recognitio n .  The res u l t  was that Dworkin C]Uictly shifted from a very 
radical t heory of leg-al reasoning to what seen1s to be, at least O() fi rst 
·10. Dworkin, T,1k111g R1ghts S<:liCJtlsl)·. ' ''/JI(J note I .  ;tl ·W. 
1 1 .  .\'fl', l' g , jmtph R.11.. Lcg.11 Ptilll ipks . 1 1HI th<"  l.i•Hits of L:''''· H I  y,,tc L:l· 8�3 ( 1!17�1 
1�. Sn· IJI\ U I I-- 1 11 ,  raking Right, �-Ninll�l\" '"''''' note I .  at :l t:l. 
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imp res · ion , a very conservat ive one. 
1 wa n t. to sugge t t h at another escape from t he dilemma Uworkin 
faced was and is available, name ly, endorsement of an appropriate version 
of the primacy model of legal principles. Recall that , accord i ng to this 
model, legal principle get their start i n l i fe a moral principles, or at least 
as standards of prac t ical reaso ning that some earlier court took to be 
correct moral principles. On the ve rsion of the model devcl opccl in this 
essay, they then become, through the ope ration of the second-order 
p ri nc iples that comprise the doc tri ne of precedem, e p istcmically 
en trenched, to some greater or lesser degree , in the law. This en trench­
ment occurs because the reasoning of previous case. is treated as 
presumptively correct. The presumption is only rcbuncd if  subsequ ent 
j udges <1rc confide n t  beyond an appropriate epistemic threshold that  the 
pr inc iple: i. not mo ral ly val id as it stan ds, and hence must ei ther be 
modi fie d or, in extreme cases, rejected outright. As we saw earl ier,  this 
mea ns that the status of a pri ncip le as a legal principle is always dependent 
on its con tin ui ng w be perceived hy judges as fa ll i ng wi thin a ccnr�in range 
of moral p lausibi l i ty. A principle's legal status is adm it tedly grounded in 
prtrl i n  a soc ia l source, since p rcsc n t j udges must look to certain social factS 
conc eming the reaso ning of judges in the past. The req ui reme n t that 
pri nciples, to be legal principle. , rnwH have figured in past judicial 
l cason i ng can be understood as a reco11struction of Dworki n ' s  ! l o tion of 
"institutional support . " At the same time. however, the legal status of a 
p r inc iple depend. i n  part o n  a normative cri terion requ i r i ng that the 
principle's content and weight fal l  within the appropriate range of rnoral 
p lausi bi l i ty. Presen t judgc·s can only rleterntinc whether this cri tt:·riun ha 
been satisifcd by consu lting their own moral beliefs and s�nsibi l i t ics. They 
mu t, in other words. contin uouS!)' engage in moral a rgumentat io n 
thcmsclvt!S, <l n d  not just look to social facts concerning t h e  past moral 
reasoning of oth cts .  
Dworkin could thus ha\'c avoided the di lemma he faced without 
adop ting t h e  rationalizalion model of legal pri nc iples. In his early 
jurisprudential work he had, as we have seen, argued fo r somet h ing sim ilar 
t�) rhc primi'\C}' mock!, and a t1rlkiently �ophist icatcd vcr. ion of that model 
wo uld l ikt:wise have pennincd h i m  to sides tep the di lemma. But the hare 
r:�n t hat Dworkin came to advocate a version of the ra t io nalization model 
doe not, b · itself, show that he had completely abandoned his earlier 
\'iews abol lt the nature of lega l pr inci pl es. This rai e the i nteresting 
(j llestion <Jf hether the ratio nali zation and pri macy rnodels can be 
combi n<'d. Dworkin has �omctimes been C' t' it ic izecl f<Jr ach·ocat ing too 
conscrv:Jt i\·c a view of the common law,'� an d [hi ' cr i t icism has mo:st force 
1:1. I r,1 l..e r l 1 1� t() Ill' t he gi�t uf Lnrr\' .-\lcxanckr'� contpbint th.u Dworkt n ' s  tht:'H)' of bw 
,.,1 1 1 11•)1 ""· ' C'1111l' t i l t• pt0bk111  of "had bt:gtnni ng.�. ·· 1 r .  th�o: pruhlt·m of mor 01l t:rrot ., i11 p:-�st 
jllrlll t .ll ll•·rtW'lllS. S i l l(t' tlu: t lwur\ IIHI\l sup pus.:d l y t.ll..t· all p.1�1 dtTI\1011� .IS t'(lll�litut i llg the 
�•·lllnl 1.11\', wht• t l w t  "'"''' d,· ,·i�iun� (nlt l . •m 111111.d < ' 1 1 0 1 �  r11 IIC>t, [),,.l• J !.: t n ' s  tll'Uo l l l l r  of legal 
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if we assume that he has adopted a pure rationalization model uf legal 
principles together with a strict version of the aULonomous conception of 
legal rules ( i.e., a version that never, or almost never, permits cases to be 
overruled on discrete substantive grounds ) .  But this assumption might be 
wrong. Because Ow·orkin docs not explicitly distinguish the two models of 
legal principles we have been considering, he of course does not  d irectly 
address the question of whether they can be combined. However, if it turns 
out that the two models are not wholly i ncompatible, thaL migh t provide 
some indirect evidence that Dworkin's mature views on adjudication and 
legal reasoning are less conservative than is  sometimes supposed. 
The rationalization model asks a judge to come up with a set of 
principles that comprise the best j ustification that can be offe red fo r the 
settled law. The model thus reqnires a body of law that is, in fact, sen led. 
On a pure rationalization model, ont: version of the " ·ettlcd law" would 
consist of autonomous rules that must be regarded as categorically binding 
on all judges in the legal system. The only grounds for r�jec ting a previous 
decision would be l he holistic gro1tnds mentioned earlier, having to do 
with the req uirement of fit. This strikes some comml:!nlators as an overly 
conservative approach to adjudication, since it presents the past as having a 
rnuch stronger hold on decision-making i n  rhe presen t  than seems to be 
tnorally warranted.H Notice, however, that regardless of which under­
standing or legal principles and rules we generally accept as correct. there 
will be circumstances in which a judge must treat a legal rule as binding 
even though he or she does not think i t  is morally valid. The n10st obvious 
such circumstance is one to which I have paid very little attent ion in this 
e say, narm�ly, the case where the rule was enacted by a legi ·laturc. For 
good moral reasons having to do with democratic theoty and relative 
institluion�J competence,  we generally do not think that courts should be 
free LO reject or rewrite legis lation just because they disagree with i t. That 
being so, it seem perL'ect.ly appt upriate to i n terpret legisla l ion i n  
accordance with a rationalization moctel of legal p1inciples, and to usc that 
mudel to maintain cnnsistenc · and c'luality of trcauncnt among citizens by 
extending the spitit of the legislation LO cases perhaps not stri c t ly covered 
by it .  
Ther · arc also, of course, many circumstances in which a jttclgc must 
treat a conwwn-law rule as hinding df'spite thinking that it. is morally 
wrong. This wi l l  clearly be true if the common law is  comprised ol 
autonontnus rules, hut i t  t emains true even if we accept a characterization 
of the comn1on law based on the prim ae)' model of pri nci ples and t he 
summat)' conLept ion of rules. For example, a judge who is bound by the 
overruling cunstr<ti n t  cannot reject omright a rule propounded by a court 
higher in the judicial hi e r arc hy . This is the case, mo reover, even though 
n:asotung " t t'f)lt tn·� lhat wt: JLISrdy the tll�justitlt'd. · Larry .-\kx:ltldtl . lind /lPJ,"'•IIIi iiJ:.I, I Li ll. 
Pa. L.  Rt:v. '> 7, :q ( l 9\.ll1 l .  
·I I. ,v,. ul 
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the rule is best regarded as a summary rule and hence a� vulnerable to 
radical modification or repudialion by a more senior courl. Further, a 
judge who is not hound by the overrul ing constraint vis-a-vis a given legal 
rule may nonetheless have to accept the rule and the core of the reasoning 
previously given in support of it because the extent of her disagreement 
does not e;:xceed the applicable epistemic thrc hold; the judge m ight think 
the ntle is wrong while sti l l  regarding it as fa lling within the appropriate 
range of moral plausibility. In such cases, the judge i s t i l l  pennitted, 
within limits, to modify the underlying reasoning, and hence to al ter the 
scope of the rule. In doing so, it seems both inevitable and appropt·iate 
that she will be inf1ucnced by her own understanding of which set of 
principles would p rovide the best justification fo r the rule in quest ion. 1 L  
� l so seems desirable, for reasons having to do with consistency and ertuality 
of treatment among citizens, that any changes she i n troduces into the 
prevailing formulation of the balance of principles should cohere as much 
as possibl(' with the entirety of the law that, from her point of view, must 
be regarcll.:d as "settled." In other words, even though the j udge is not 
looking for the best justification as such for the setdcd Jaw, i t  seems 
appropriate that she should reaso n, at least sometimes, in accordance wi th 
the spir it of the rationalization model. 
The latter poitH is a generC\1 one wi th in  the primacy model of legal 
princ iples; it does n()l · i mply apply to judges who happen to ht: hound by a 
particular legal ru le.  Thus whenever a judge is free to in troduce a change 
imo the prevailing balance of principles, iu doing so she houlcl tr-y to 
m<-tintain overall consistency with as much of the settled Jaw as possible 
(''settlt:d law" n1eaning, here, Jaw that the judge is not, for whatever reason, 
at the moment in a po i tion to modify).  This is as true with m<�jor changes, 
i n volving an overruling, say, as i t  is with minor ones. Over all nom1ativc 
consistency among the principles that underlie the law is, at the very least, 
a desideratum;  to the exten t that it is possible, the courts should speak 
with one , morall}: consiste nt ,  voice. This, I take it, is at least part of what 
Dworkin has i n  mind when l i e  speaks of "i ntc!;rity" as an independent  
political vinue.4�' 
Consider also the following possibility. Assume as before that lhe 
primacy model of legal principles, together with the sum mary conr:cption 
of legal rules, offe r the best intcrpretaLion of the common law. There 
could well arise situations in which a court considering one or more 
relevant precedents thinks that the earlier courts were generally right in 
t h e  results they reached, but quite wrong in their reasoning. So long as the 
appropriate <'pis t cmic threshold had been rne r ,  r hc present court would 
presumably respond to the problem by u-yi ng to <Hticulatc the correct set 
of moral principles applicable to the t}'pc of case in question. If  it succeeds 
in th i:. attempt. the principle the court ;-tnirulatcs will justify the previous 
�e t of results as a matter of course. This is a perfectly appropriace move 
·15 �·,.,. Dwo1 k1 1 1 ,  111/1111 nnt<' � I .  at 1 6 1-Gi. 
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wi thin the pri mncy model, even though the cou rt would be searchi ng, in 
eiTcct,  for t h e  bes t justi fication of "the settled law." The law, me an i ng now 
the reslllts reac hed in one or more previ ous case , is treated as seulcd 
because i t  is thought to b�;: co1·rect. A s i m i lar situat iCln could arise 
regarding not just the bare re ul ts  in preced i n g cases but also a pre-viously 
enunciated ummary rule that the present co\lrc regards as moral ly correct, 
but for rea ons di fferin g  from those or igi nal l y offered in support of it. In 
such cases, the ratio nalization model of legal princ i p les and the pri macy 
model i n  eiTect  converge; each rrcommcncls essen ti al ly the same course of 
action to the pre ·ent court. �bny of the most fa mous cases wi th in  the 
common law, suc h as MacPherson 11. Buick Motor Co. 11' and Dorwgh ul' v . 
. Ievenson, 1 7  ecm to he of thi general type. 
So far as t he primacy model of legal p1inc ipl cs is concerned, this  
sugge t' thaL legal reasoning i nvolves a process somewhat anal0gous 
to-although by no means ident ical wi th-Rawls' notion of rc11ective 
eC]uil ibrium. Gene ra l ly speaking, 'rVe can suppose t hat the courts aim over 
t ime to bri ng the settled rules of t h e  common law as c losely into l int: as 
po sihle with the balance of correct moral princi ples. Because the rule-of­
law values ca n n m  be t.a ken direnly into acou n t as first-order pri nci ples, the 
co1 1rts try to �ive effect to this a i m  hy foc us i ng on the balance of legal 
principles ,  i.e . .  pt inc ip les th<ll <:ll lCilSt at one t ime were regarded by t he 
rourts a· morally correc t and t hal as a result have become epi.qcll l ically 
c ·n 1 renched in L h e  law. Sometimes the cou rts will be led to mod ify t he 
existing formulation of legal principles because t hey th in k  i t  is too far ou t 
of l ine •.vith their best pn.:scnt lllldcrst.anding of the balance of moral 
princ i pl es ( i. IJ. , firsl-ot der, substtm livc moral pri nciples,  whic h do no1 
i nc lude the rule-of-law vr� lues) . This will generally lead to c hang<'S in 
s�tmn1 :try rules and to diffe rent rcsull.) in some specific s itua ti ons . At other 
times, however, the courts wi l l be led to modify t h e  existing formulat ion of 
legal principles-and even, in appropriate circumstances, to modify their 
p resen t under t.tu ding of the h�1 lance of ruoral principles itself-because 
that  formubtion no lonf{Cr �ectns capable of justifying t h e  specific res\ I I L'> 
in a set of t"arlin cases, or 0ne or more specific summ::uy nt les, that 
con 1 i n ue t�' :.- t 1 ikt: the courts as i n tui t ively correct. Although the i'l:,ue 
cannot be pursued further here. the fact that the primacy model of legal 
principles thus regards legal reaso ni n g as involving a process similar t•J 
reflect ive cqu i l ibr iun1  migh t  well be thoug h t  to be a mark in its favor. 
In the c\iscll'isinn in the prec eding four paragraphs, l hflve beea 
supposing th�l the pri macy r nodel of legal princip les is primary in the 
common law and have lhrn he<• t t  asking, in effect, how Jeaal rcasoni tw � •) 
might sorncti mes he expected to resemble legal reaso ning unclrr 1 he 
rarinnalitation model.  Let me now s11 pposc, presumably wgcthcr with t h t• 
laLn Dworki n ,  tkH the rationali1.ation model is pr imnry. Might it b t h  
II;, I l l  :O.i E<  l i).)ll ( :--:.\". l !l l !i ) . 
t7. t �l.\'1 ,\r p. c.'·'· ·,:;·! <J L L J .  
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case that legal reC\soning would sometimes resemble the reason i ng called 
for by the primacy model? Recal l that the rationalization model of legal 
pri nc ip l es requires a body of settled law upon which to operate. It  does 
not, however, itself specify how that body of settled law i!i to be 
determined. On a parti cu larly conservative un derstandi ng of the 
raLionalization model, the settled law \·vill consist of autonomous legal rules 
that can only be modified in accordance with the holistic demands of 
Dworkin ' s  requ i remen t of "Jit"; a partictllar rule cou ld only be re jec ted if i t  
fe ll outside th<H pan o f  the sett led law lhat was j u  L ified by the  best 
j u tification.  
There arc, however, other poss ible cha racteri Lations of the sett led law. 
Ima�rine that an epistem ic threshold app l ied , not to the reason ing of a past 
judicial decision, but simply to the rule that th at reaso ning was su pposed 
to justify. The ques tion would thus be: does the rule fall \vi th in the 
appropriate range of moral plausibil i ty, where this '''auld be determined by 
asking whether there i any plausible j ustification that cou l d  be given for i t .  
We would not, in other words, be l imited to aski ng whether the n:: asoni ng 
ac tually offered i n  support of the rule in past judicial decisions was 
plausible to the req u isite degree. T h e  rules that fell with i n  the appropriate 
range of moral plausibility would then consti tu te the core of the "sett led 
law . "  Those rules that did not fall wi th in this range would lose what 
Dworkin in  Hm·tl Cases called their gravi tational fo rce. �M Moral theories 
o ffe red as ca ndi da tes for the best j us t ificat io n of the settled J aw would no t 
have to take these rul es i n to account al all, even on a pri ma facie basis. ff 
uch a rule were in it.s term applicable to the case before the court, i t  
would be vu l nerabl e to losi ng i ts  e n ac t rne nt force as well. I n  oth er words, 
earlier decisions that had either enacted or ap p lied the rule would be 
liable to he overruled. 
On the understanding of th e settled law ju t sketched, the rules 
c o nst i tu t in g the common law would be neither pure summary rules, since 
they would not be Lied to a particular fom1ttl<uion of the balance of 
principles, nor pure autonomous rules, si nce they would be subject to a 
cri te rion of moral plausibility. This means, among o ther 1. hings, that they 
could not be characterized in wholly source-based terms. Dworkin agrees 
with Raz t ha t the on ly defensi ble version of positivism requires valid law to 
be iden t i llable solely by refere nce to social sources; criteda that are wholly 
or parrly moral in nature canneL form pan of the rule of recog n i tion.�u It  
follows, given t lw possibil i ty of i mc rprct ing the sett led common law along 
the line� we have just been consi deri ng, that Dworkin does not have to 
regard h is use of the rationalization model of' legal princ iples as res ting on 
a pos i ti\'i�t fo11ndation. He docs not, in other words, have to regard the 
set tled law as cornpriscd of a sou rce-based set of autonomous ru les . In fact, 
-!S. \ n • l) ,,· u r " '" ·  Tal:.i11g Rights Serious!) . .  wjm1 rlotf' I .  a t  I l l .  
1�1. I n  Uwor'klll·, ll'r nrlnulugy. posi t i \rism ll'tprir �·., \.didir� I < J  he a r rr;cttt·r of p:·drgrec. s,.,. 
DwcJt l..in.  T.tki n �  Rrglm Scr iiJLrsl�, 111/Jifl nott: I . •  1 1  ! 7 .  :\ � �. 
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the reconstruction o f  the rationalization model that this understanding of 
the settled law yields is not very far removed from the primacy model. The 
main difference is that, by insisting that common-law cases be decided in 
accordance with a single moral theory ( " the best j ustification of the settled 
law"),  it treats consistency in ptinciple-the courts speaking with one, 
morally consistent voice-as a lexically prior goal in adj udication and not 
just as one desideratum among oth ers. This, it seems to me, i very much 
in line with Dwork i n ' s  charactetization of in tegrity in Law's Empire.511 Thi 
recons truct ion of the rationalization model also has the advantage of 
permitting us to reconcile Dworki n ' s  reliance on that model in his later 
work with much of what he says in his earliest writings on jurisprudence. 
This is because, in line with his position in The Model of Rules !, the 
rt!construction regards legal rules not as autonomous norms but ra ther as 
the upshot or some plausible formulation of the balance of principles 
(alt .hough not, perhaps, of the formulation offe red in the rclevarn 
precedenL") . 
The account of the settled law suggested in the preceding paragraph 
i · , in my vic,v, truer to Dworkin's own understanding of that notion in 
Law's Empire than would be an account based on pure auto n omous legal 
rules. I shall not,  however, try ro defend that conclusion here. Wha tever 
Dworki n's own view of the matter might have been, the important point 
for present pttrposcs is the fo llowing. It is possible tO con true Dworkin'�  
reliance on t he rationalization model of legal principles in such a way as to 
allow for the judicial rejection of individual rules of law on discrete 
substa n t ive grounds, and not j ust  on holistic grounds having to do with the 
general re quirement of fi L Understood in this way, the account of legal 
reaso ning that Dworkin adopts in Hard Cases and then defends in a slight ly 
different version in Law's E111pire wo uld not be vulnerable to the cri tjcism 
that i t  is overly consc.;rvative in nature. Furthermore, since t h e  individual 
componentS of the settled law would all have to bC', to some appropriate 
degree, morally plausible, t h e  principles wmpri · ing t he best possible 
justification for t he seuled law could t h e mselves he expcc tl"cl to fa ll within 
a11 acceptable range uf moral plausibility. This, as we shall sec i n  t he 
fo llowing 'iection, i'i very relevant to the criticpte of legal principles that has 
been advanced hy Alexanrler and Kress. 
VI. Al.EXANDER .-\SD KRESS'$ CRITIQtlr: 
In their i n teresting an.iclc ent itled 11gainsl L,.gul Principles, ·o� La1 ry 
Alexander and Ken Kress argue tltat legal principles,  like the et her, do not 
exist. At the vcty least, they claim,  legal principles are res 1/0/1 gm/(/c; they 
are norl)lative l)' unclesi rablt: entities. The core o f  the.: aroumcnt is 
'>traightfo n,·ard. Begi n n i n g  with the assumption that legal principles are 
30. .\, ,. l)w...,, kin,  "t/Jffl nntl' 2 1 ,  a 1  1 6•1-67. l76-86. 
3 I .  .\ l (•x,lnrlt·l ,'\.: K"·'�· <itfna no1 (' t 7, t•'/mlltlll m K2 Iowa L. Rc\. 7:\9 ( t997).  
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best characterized by reference to what I have bee n calling the 
ralionali7.ation model , Alexander and Kress maintain that such pri nc iples 
represent the worst of all worlds. Legal ' p ri nc ip les are appropriately 
compared lO legal rules, on the one hand, and moral princi ples, on lhe 
otb er. Legll rules are pos i ted and have been given a canonical 
formulatio n ,  Lhcreby perm iu i ng them LO provi de relative ly clear guidance 
for conduct.''2 Leg·al pri nc iples do not possess t h is vi rtue, since th ey are 
not po ited and have no canonical formulation. Very ofte n they wi ll be 
con troversial in their application, partic u larly given their di m ension of 
we i gh t . Moral princi ples, on the other hand, are al o controversial in their 
appl ication, but they at least have the virtue or bei ng morally correct. Legal 
pri ncipl �s lack this virtue as well , however, since they arc what l earl ier 
called econd-be t; morally speaking, they can be no better than the settled 
l aw they ju tify. Alexander and Kress conclude that we wo uld do best in 
acUudic ation to employ l egal rules for dear guidance and moral p rinc iples 
for mora l correctness. As for legal ptinciples, assumi ng they even exist , we 
sho u ld simply banish them from the forum of kg::tl re aso n in g altogeth-
cr. .. � 
Alexander and Kress supplement thi · core argument with a number 
of ancilltll)' arbrumcnts. The most i mportant of Lhese fo r present purposes 
seem to me LO be the following. First, we do not need legal pri nci ples as a 
means for extend i ng equal i ty, i n  the sense of consiste ncy of treatment, 
from past judic ial decisions i nt o  the futun�, because equal i ty is a theory­
depe nden t rather than a free-standing value; what comtiwtes a relevan t 
s imi larity for purposes of treat ing like cases alike will  vary from one moral 
t heor; to another. "Thus, ther� cannot be a coherent reason i n  terms of 
r l!e true moral value of equality fo r ever clepat Ling from the requ ire men ts 
o f  the correct moral r heory. " .'4 A econd and related argument  is the 
fo llowing: 
The best i ncorrec t pri nciples that fit past mistakes are morally 
corrt:ct priuciplcs with exceptions corresponding precisely to 
those mistakes. Such incorrec t princi plt:s wi l l  be the practical 
equival cnrs of correct principles. Legal principles correctly 
derived will thus al ways col lapse into moral pritH.:iples.�'· 
The: set o f  incorrect princ iples here described, namely, the set of corre c t  
principles with exc ept ions co rres ponding to past mistakes. will  generate its 
uwn conception of equali ty. Moreover, all litiganL-; are being treated 
P q ual ly in the se nse that our best view at the time of what is j ust wil l  have 
been applird tu each of t h e m ."11 The L h i rd supplcmcn1 ary argumcm is 
52. .-\l(·x;llldo:r ,Jild KJ c:s.� clearly conccivc: of lc:gal 1 ulc:s i u  1 .: 1  rns of, to usc rny 
ten 111111vlogy, the ;�uton0mous conception of rules. 
:)'t 'i1·� ,\lexandc1 &: K1css, ·"'/"'1 note 1 7, ,tt 293·9-!, rrfmntnl :11 H2 !owa L. Rei'. 7:39. 753-
·, I ( !�J�I7 1 .  
:1 I /r/ at '295, "fnwfo'tl 111 �'l Iuw<1 I . ,  Rc:r. 739, 755 ( 1997) . 
. Y1 /d ;It :lOIJ. lo/HIIIfl'rf lll t�2 lrt\1'.\ L. Re1·. 7:�!1. 769 ( El�)7) . 
·'> I ) '1rr 1t! . •  1t :10::\. 1Pfnwlrrl iu lt! iow:t L. Rei'. 739, 7l).5 ( l ll�) 7 \ .  
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that it i s  i mpossib le to assign a we igh t to incorrect pri nc i ples. Be i ng 
in correct they cannot have a real weight ,  so that  any pu rponed 
determination or as 'i gnmcn t of we ight will in t h�;; e n d  he moral ly 
arbitary.
"' Th e fourth and fi n al argu ment [ wi ll consider is th at the rnoral 
effect of past, incorrect dec is i ons is pro per!)' given cons iderat ion , not 
through legal princi p les, but rath er by taki ng i nto accou nt the re lian ce 
and expectations t hose decisions have generated.;� 
A preliminary di ffic u l ty with Alexander and Kress's cri t ique of legal 
pJinc i pl cs is that it looks solely to the rationalization mode l of principles 
and not at all to the p rimacy model , even though Dworki n ' s early work. in 
jurisprudence is best understood by refe rence lo a versi on of the Iauer 
approac h. By focusiug on the rationalization mone l ,  they arc naturally led 
i n  their core argument to comrast the ''i ncorrec t " pr i nc ipl e· that  n o do11bt 
figure i n  even the best justifica t..ion or the seuled law with the "correc t" 
principles of ideal moral theory. Given a clear choice bc t>\'een correc t and 
incorrect pri nciples, how could anyone not agree with AJcx ander and Kress 
that we shou ld go with correctness and repu diate incorrectness? The 
difficulty with th is argument, of course, is that in t h e  hard cases where 
reliance on legal pri nc iples is goi ng to make a prac t..ic,tl d i fference , we are 
almost never [;:teed with such a clear ch o ice . On the primacy model , at 
least, legal pr i nc iples on ly come i nto being because of the need to inj ect 
some predictability and consistency into legal rea!.ion i ng in the face of 
uncertainty and comroversy over what the moral ly correct  pri ncip les are 
and what their weight is. Mora li ty is not, for u , epi stt: m ical ly transparent, 
al though at c ruc ia l points in their  argume n t  Alexander and Kress seem to 
assume that i t  is. 
Legal pr i nciples represent, on both the prilllacy and rationalization 
models, a trade-off between pe rceived mor:1l correctness, on the one hand , 
and consistency and predictabili 1y, o u  the othe r . (The ration:dizacion 
model emphasizes global, inwrnal consistency much ntore hca"i ly than 
does the primacy mode l . )  In an epistemic a l ly non transparent world, a 
trade-off of this kind i inevitable. Moreover, the primacy mode l effcxts this 
trade-off hy permit ting j udge� to modi fy or reject legal princi ples when a 
certai n epis tcm ic th reshold is exceeded; whe n . i n  other words, tl1e relevant 
pri ncip les no longer fall i n to an appro priate range: of moral plausibi l i ty, as 
determined from the viewpoint of the p rc!lc."nt court. O n  the rccon t ruc ted 
version of the rati nalizalion model  sketched at the end of the prrred ing 
section , a sim ilar point hol ds . The legal rules t h il t  Ci)nsti tut�;; the sc: t Li r.d law 
mu t rail within a cert.a in range of moral plausibilitv, and when t h C)' do so 
the best holistic justification nf t hose ntl<:>s ran itsr.: lf be expec t e d  w be , t o  
some appropriate degree, mor<llly p lausi ble . I n  any c: v  ... m, a n  aclm0nition 
thar the courts shou ld r.:ly 0 1 1  morall}' co1 rcct princ i p l es is, in the face oi 
5i. Sl'l' irl. nl 'IDl ·O·l, r.•jm n!l'f[ il l  8� luh·a L. Re1•. 73�1. 7(' tJ .(i I ( 19H7l . 
5 . .'irr .-\lcxanclcr & !-'..J ess . .  <�•fmt note 17,  �� 296. �09, II'Jmnf•'" 111 .�2 lo''·' L. Rc1·. 739, i.)li. 
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great moral uncertainty and controversy, not in  the least helpful. 
Alexander and Kress migh t, however, be taken as arguing that a court 
should rely on the principles that it perceives to be correct at the time of 
deci ion, regardless of what has been done in the pasl. The claim would 
be, in effect, that if  a court always does this, then (a) equality of trealment 
will take care of it.self (supplemen tary arguments l and 2 ) ,  and (b) the 
demands of st.abil i ty and predictabi l i ty can be met by taking i n to 
consideration the reliance and expectations that past decisions have 
generated (suppleme ntary argument 4).  In other words, the trade-off 
between perceived moral correctness, on the one hand, and consiste ncy 
and predictability on the olher, can be met without invoking legal 
principles. Let us consider claims (a) and (b) in turn. 
Alexander and Kress correct ly point  out that equal i ty is a theory­
dependent value, from which it  follows that t l te only true co nception of 
equal i ty is the one assoc iated with tiM, uniquely correct, moral theory . That 
does not take us very far, however, if we do not know what that theory is.  
What courts tend to face in hard cases is a number of competing, more or 
l�ss plausible, theories or min i-theories, as the example discussed i n  
Section IV jl lustnues. Each such r.heory will generate i ts own,  more or  less 
plausihle, conception of equality. The claim of the primacy model is that, 
unless a court's confidence in the correctness of its present  views exceeds 
the requisi te epistemic threshold, i t  should stick with and fu rther develop 
the principles accc.:pted as correct by the earlier court. Those principles 
give ris(•, by h}'pothesis, to a conception of equal i ty Lhat fal ls within an 
appropriate range of moral plausibility. There is th LI!i a reasonable chance 
that that i:. the rorrrct conception of equal i ty, even if the pre elll cou rt does 
not think so. If, however, the present court r �ens the past judicial 
reasoning and strikes off on i ts own, then i t  can be certain that past and 
present l itiganrs are being treated inconsistentJy. Cont rary to what 
Alexander and Kress assert , there is no conception or equality associated 
with the theory that consists of "morally correct principles with exc('ptions 
corresponding precisely to [past) mi takes.,;!) That i because this "theory" 
could not possibly be the correct moral theOI)', and hence could not 
possibly generate a plausible i n ternal conception of equali t}·· Because 
equality will definitely be cnm promised i f  the courr departs from the mode 
of reasoning accepted in  tilt· past, it .)l10uld not do so u nless i t  is confident 
r o  an appropriarc:ly high degree that i ts prese n t  virw::; are correct. Finally, 
by sticking with the principles accepted as correct by the em·J ier court, the 
present COI\rt is also, of course, giving effect Lo the values of predictability 
and stability. 
lr bears mention at lhis poilll that each of several competing, more or 
less plau�ible moral theories, in additiou to giving rise 1o an i n ternal 
conception of equality, wi l l  also con L<l.in its mvn i n ternal conception of the 
rdative weights to be attached tO illclividual principles. This is thC' st.-1.ni ng-
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poi m of an answer lO supp lemen ml)' argument 3. On no such theory will 
the weigh t<; associated with individual pri n c i ples ever be anythi ng other 
than very rough and to some exte n t  indeterminate asscsst nents of re lat ive 
importance. �ot even the u n iquely correct moral theory, w hatever i t  is, will 
assign weights on the fi n e-grained cardinal continuum that Alexander and 
Kress seem at t imes to envisage. 
This brings us, fi n a l ly . to supplementary argumen t 4 ,  wh ich holds that 
stability and predictability can be taken into account b)' giving proper 
wei gh t to t he reliance and expec ta tions that mistaken dec ision s  have 
gene rated in the past. This argume n t  was an tic ipated i n  Section I l l ,  wh ere 
i t  was po in ted out that a court sh ould not take into account reliance unless 
i t  ha previously i nduced that reliance, and t hat it should not take i nto 
account expectations unless they arc justilied. Bm expectations can on ly be 
jLtstilied, and reliance thereby i nduced, if the court has already annou nced 
that it will  follow prccedem. Unless the court adheres to a mo ral ly 
i mplausible doc trine of precedent t hat requires it Lo comply with previous 
dec is ions no matter how obviously wrong, i t  must, in followi ng precedent, 
balance the rule-of-law values of consistt:>ncy and predictab i l i ty at,rainst 
subs tan tive princ ip les that might call for a change i n  the law. Becau c the 
rule-of-law values do not pull in any part.i cular substantive direc tion, th<:>y 
mu 1. be regarded as second-order principles; they arc, in effect, functions 
rhat ta ke instances of past judicial reasoning as argument<;. But to emp loy 
second-order pri nc iples in th is way will  have the c!Tect of cpistemically 
cntrcuching first-order moral principles upon which courL'I have previous ly 
relied. According to the primacy modd of legal p ri nc ipl es, those 
cpistemically entrenched moral prin c ipl es are noth ing 111ore and nothing 
less than legal p1 i nci plcs. 
